Author: mericfunda@gmail.com

  • Ahmet Şık’s statement at the hearing of the July 27, 2017 Cumhuriyet Trial

    Ahmet Şık’s statement at the hearing of the July 27, 2017 Cumhuriyet Trial

    I will begin with a quote from the prologue of my book “We walked together on these parallel roads” published three years ago in 2014. The introduction of this investigative research describes how the mafia-like power sharing between the AKP (Justice and Development Party) and the Gulen Sect fell apart. It reads as follows:

    “The alliance between AKP and the Gulen Sect, backed by their acolytes, which transformed Turkey both socially and politically, has collapsed and sewage is flowing everywhere. These two forces, driven by a Machiavellian understanding that used all possible means to establish a freak ‘New Turkey,’ have now broken up.

    Neither wanted the democratization of the system or the society. Each one aimed at exerting their authority to seize the State through its institutions, and together they managed successfully to infiltrate these institutions to achieve their goal.

    Each one thought that eventually, they would be the sole power in charge of the state and firmly committed to this endeavor while fighting together against their common enemy, they accumulated evidence to destroy each other.

    It became soon apparent that these findings would be imminently put to use. Threats from media columnists, secret purges, occasionally leaked telephone conversations, unlawful operations organized by the police together with the judges, and eventually after targeting their mutual enemies, they were now pointing at members of the government. All these were signs of what was about to happen.

    Convinced that there were no more opponents to eliminate, they fought each other over who was to be the owner of the state. It was a dirty business, and it still is. And it looks like it will be continuing in this manner for quite some time.

    In this fight where the ethical values of religion are instrumentalised, the lies that fulfill the needs of both parties, have more weight for them than the truth. So be not deceived by their arguments. This battle is not for democracy, or for transparency, nor as some claim, peace or demilitarization. It is a struggle for the ownership of the state.”

    The battle between AKP and the Gulen Sect intensified after the publication of my book. The fake historiography which started with the Ergenekon trials in 2007 and the fight between the party in power and its accomplices, as to whom would plunder the country and the state to get the most out of it, went as far as an attempted military coup. On July 15th, 2016, a bloody insurgency took place where 250 people were killed.

    The government blamed the failed coup on the Gulenists, and this is what we are expected to believe. Yet there are strong indications of the government knowing about it before hand. The questions around this have not diminished but increased even though a year has passed since the uprising, and numerous investigations were opened on the matter.

    The upheaval of July 15th has many hallmarks that not only seem to be deliberately covered-up in subsequent investigations but which strengthen the suggestion that is was allowed to go ahead to create an environment of “controlled chaos” for the use and benefit of the government. This insurgency is also a significant milestone of the fabricated historiography which has been spreading around over a period covering the last decade. The oft used “democratization/ civilianization” narrative has served to build an artificial reality made up of lies, with its only truth being the innocent victims slaughtered by the putschists.

    There are reasons for questioning what is left in the dark from the failed coup d’état and what we call a “controlled chaos.” While the country was still in a pool of blood Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the primary target of the coup, declared:” This insurgency is a God sent blessing.” We have all seen what he meant by “blessing”, we have witnessed it, and we still are.

    We are living through increasingly darker days where those voicing the truth or demanding the return of their rights that were seized are clamped down and silenced. In brief, it would be beneficial to summarize the situation:

    The coup was averted, but all fundamental rights and freedoms have been suspended by the state of emergency. Tens of thousands have been detained charged with being part of the Gulen organization and supporting the upheaval. More than 50 thousand were arrested. Some were even tortured.

    With decrees having the power of law, the government speeded up the project of Islamisation of the state and the society. The only criteria that justified the purges in the public sector was “those who are with us and those who are not”. More than 110.000 (one hundred and ten thousand) civil servants were sacked. The vacant positions in the state administration such as the judiciary, security, education etc. were replaced with members of the AKP who were not chosen for their competence but their allegiance to the ruling party.

    Scientists and teachers who for decades educated students were suddenly laid off accused of being terrorists. Rightfully contesting the government’s decision, those who went on a hunger strike to get their jobs back have been jailed.

    The fundamental principle of separation of powers has been de facto wiped away, and a shady plebiscite voted under the prevailing conditions of the state of emergency, opened the way to a de jure situation.

    The judicial independence with a few exceptions has always been a problem in Turkey. Today the judicial independence of the courts has been undermined by the judges and prosecutors forced to accommodate the wishes of the government. The violation of civil liberties has been hijacked by the terror of arrests spreading even to the country’s third largest party represented in parliament with six million votes. The co-chairpersons of the HDP (People’s Democratic Party), as well as members of parliament and elected major in office of the same party, have been sent to prison. And the main opposition party paved the way to this clamp down, fearing of being wrongly accused of “protecting terrorists.” Eventually, even a CHP (Republican People’s Party) deputy was imprisoned.

    Several NGOs have been closed down, human rights activists were arrested, and hundreds of private business companies were seized and nationalized.

    The coup was aborted, and while the country was chanting the triumph of democracy, in the media a significant number of newspapers, television channels and radio stations were shut down. Except for a handful of newspapers and a few journalists who are holding on in spite of interrogations, trials, arrests, threats and economic pressure, there is no one in the media or amongst the journalists who informs the public without masking the truth. With more than one hundred and fifty journalists detained, Turkey was declared once more “the world’s largest prison for journalists”. In fact, Turkey alone has more journalists in jail than the totality of the rest of the world.

    If we add to the list the journalists who are not imprisoned but who are captives of censorship and self-censorship the picture becomes even more disturbing. Because of the murky shadows of censorship, in spite of the fact that the media is in the hands of different owners, the flow of information provided to the public is mono vocal.

    Televisions channels are required to broadcast live images of President Erdoğan even when he is talking in his sleep and government inspectors must be present during political televised debates.

    When the conventional media is in such a state, social media platforms are the only outlet for political criticism. If access to information has not been blocked, if the government has not shut down the Internet, if you have not written comments that might displease AKP’s paid staff of trolls or an anonymous and or even a public prosecutor, then you are free to use your right to criticize. However, there is no guarantee that you will not be arrested.

    This is a summary of the country’s dismal image in the aftermath of the failed coup.

    In a nutshell on July 15th a coup d’état was crushed, but a junta came to power.

    In the indictments drawn up after the coup attempt, the objectives of the Gulenists were described as follows:

    “To take control over the Constitutional institutions of the Turkish Republic, namely the legislative, executive and judicial institutions. On completion of this process, to redesign the state, the society, and the individuals according to the Gulenist ideology; to rule over the economic, social and political power with an oligarchic structure.”

    Today when you look at the bloody insurgency perceived as a God sent blessing, what comes out in the picture is what I have just summarised, and who could say that what has been described in the indictments has not been achieved?

    Have they not taken over all the institutions of the Turkish Republic, that is the legislative, executive and the judicial?

    By implementing the State of Emergency and decrees with power of law, are they not trying to design the state, the society, and the individuals to suit their ideology and their interest?

    Is it not their intention to loot the resources of the state and the country, and for this purpose are they not trying to establish an oligarchy that will rule the economic, social and the political power?

    This is why June 15th, which was the Gulen Sect’s greatest defeat, is at the same time their ultimate victory.

    Because Fethullah Gulen’s idealized model of state, society and of individuals came into being after the uprising of June 15th.

    The shaping of this project is rapidly moving on, and while those who are for democracy should firmly oppose it, no matter who controls this prototype, the patent belongs to Fethullah Gulen.

    Precisely for this reason Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the AKP government have given Fethullah Gulen and his Sect whatever they requested.

    In the aftermath of the bloody insurgency where there is not a shadow of a doubt that the Gulen Sect, known now as FETÖ (Fethullah Terror Organization), was one of the forces behind the coup, they (Erdogan & AKP) behave as if they did not share the responsibility.

    They do not want us to tell the truth or to say that they are guilty.

    They are using the blood of the victims killed by the putschists as material for a cheap and shallow political discourse.

    Those that are in power have only one goal. To maintain their absolute authority at all costs.

    And for this they will do all sorts of evil; they will get rid of anyone. Their long history of governance is packed with people with whom they had started off together and then left aside one by one. When someone has served the purpose, when they are no longer needed, they leave them behind. They have abandoned supporters, accomplices and partners in crime. They even discarded friends who shared their cause. Obviously, those that are still with them and those who have recently joined them will suffer the same fate.

    Most of the media outlets are now beating the drums for the government, and the remaining few who insist on disclosing the wrongdoings and the bad intentions of those in power, are sent to prison to keep them silent.

    They think they can frighten us and keep us quiet. To prove them wrong, I shall continue with the story.

    The Gulen Sect has a forty-five year past history, where during the first thirty years they completed their linear structural organization within the state, and in the last fifteen years, they finalized their vertical growth. Thanks to opportunities provided by the AKP government, the Gulen Sect was virtually able to become a parallel state without anyone standing in their way.

    The Sect acquired considerable power in the police force, the judiciary and the core divisions of the army. Together with the AKP government, it was not difficult to settle into key positions of authority.

    Then they took over spheres of influence based on their previously established priorities by discharging opponents in governmental and civilian administrations as well as getting rid of rival institutions.

    To put it bluntly, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is responsible, together with the AKP which has been in power for the last fifteen years, for allowing the Gulen Sect to dominate and become a threat to the state and the society. The Turkish President admitted his guilt by saying: “What did they asked for that we did not give?” and “I apologize for giving them our support.” Therefore, they are just as accountable for the upheaval of July 15th.

    I shall give you specific examples, but beforehand it would be useful to recall some facts:

    A substantial number of officers, who were not part of the Gulenist Sect, was discharged from the Turkish Armed Forces during the inquests of the alleged conspiracies which began with Ergenekon, followed by Balyoz (Sledgehammer), military espionage, and other similar plots. Those that were cleared of wrongdoings were denied advancement, with the intent of humiliating them.

    Erdogan who was Prime Minister at the time declared himself the prosecutor of these trials.

    The AKP government, as the approving political authority, was an accomplice in the violation of the law and shielded the perpetrators of the conspiracies from accusations and criticism.

    Now AKP is putting all the blame on the Gulen congregation in an attempt to hide their crimes and their responsibility.

    At that time, numerous hitmen working in the media outlets of the AKP-Gulen partnership were vilifying the imprisoned victims of the Gulenist conspiracies. Some of them were journalists who became facilitators and partners in concealing AKP’s crimes. And I need to stress that these journalists used defamatory stories to belittle those in prison and dishonor them.

    Going back to the trials plotted by the Gulenist against the Army, the military promotion lists and ranks were then designed to pave the way for the followers of Gulen according to their objectives and for their benefit.

    Obviously, the Officers who were not part of the Gulen Sect and who were discharged because of the trials were not the only purged. It was the AKP government who came to the aid of the Gulenists to eliminate the remaining ones in the Army. And they did this while there was a war between them.

    Let us see what has happened…

    With the legal amendments of May 2012, the 15 year mandatory service of the military personnel was reduced to 10 years. The Gulenists estimated that this change would incite some of the officers opposed to Gulen to leave the army. And this is what happened. The climate of fear created with the cooked-up trials and the army’s loss of reputation gave way to resignations.

    Strangely enough, after this amendment, some significant structural legal changes were made after the beginning of the feud between the AKP and the Gulen Sect.

    What turned this feud into a bitter fight, severing their alliance beyond repair, was the corruption probe of 17/25 December 2013. The operations showing that the State Intelligence Service (MIT) helped deliver arms and ammunitions to jihadists fighting against the regime in the Syrian civil war, took place at the same time.

    While the relationship was tense, some AKP deputies brought forward to Parliament a proposal to legally reform some military regulations, which was then voted and accepted.

    The first amendment approved by Parliament, with the majority of AKP votes, was on February 11th, 2014. It advanced the military promotions by 1 year, which meant that colonels with 4 years of service and generals with 3 years of service, most of whom were members of the Gulen Sect, were able to join the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ). Furthermore, it also enabled the early retirement of the generals who were not on their side and who had not been promoted by the Military Council.

    The second amendment was made two months later. It came into effect on April 12th, 2014. The Disciplinary Control Board of the Turkish Armed Forces formed new disciplinary committees to assess the Officers discharged from the Army. The guiding lines of these committees are established by the Personnel Qualification Records. The adjustments made to these Records blocked the discharge of fundamentalists from the Army.

    Another reform request came from 37 AKP Members of Parliament to the President of the Assembly on December 30th, 2015. With this amendment of the law, the waiting period for the promotion of colonels to the rank of generals was cut down to 4 years. This enabled the Gulenists colonels who had not yet filled their time to become generals.

    The last adjustment was to the Military Personnel Law no.6722 and the Law on the amendments to certain regulations.

    In 1988 and the years preceding this date, the graduate Officers of the Military Academies members of the Gulen Organization were a small minority.

    These amendments reduced the years in the service of the Army to 28 years.

    Thus, the Sect could send into early retirement the officers of these three terms, the majority of which were not on their side, and discharge them from the Army en masse.

    The alleged ringleaders of the aborted coup of July15th, Generals Mehmet Dişli and Mehmet Partigöç, had prepared the draft. It was assumed that except for one article, once the bill passed it would immediately take effect. The excluded article, which concerned the retirement of the Officers graduated in 1988 and earlier, when the Gulen organization in the Army was at its weakest, was expected to be implemented after the Military Council of August 2016. On the night of June 23rd, during the discussions in Parliament on the drafted bill, the AKP group put forward a motion, and the article was included in the Law that passed with immediate effect.

    The show trials orchestrated with the unlimited support of the AKP government and the amended regulations backed by the state allowed, to a large extent, the Gulen Sect to reach their goal by purging the Army. The consequence of this will become clearer after June 15th.

    To be more specific I will quote the report presented, with an opposing opinion, by the CHP (Republican People’s Party) to the Parliamentary Investigating Commission on the aborted coup of July 15th, entitled “The Predicted, not Prevented and Exploited Controlled Coup.”

    According to the report, nearly all the generals promoted in 2011, 2012 and 2013, based on the resolutions taken by the Military Council, are accused of being part of the Gulen Sect. And as mentioned before, with the legal amendments made by the AKP government, in the following years, that is in 2014 and 2015, 80% of the colonels promoted to the rank of generals are also alleged Gulenist.

    Meanwhile, between 1985 and 2003, the year when AKP comes to power, 400 staff members of the Army were expelled for supposedly supporting the Gulen Sect. It is important to note however, that after 2013 and until the attempted coup, there were no further expulsions.

    I would also like to mention that the decisions taken by the National Security Council of 2004, were not implemented. And I shall conclude the narrative of this chapter by emphasizing that the effective power of the Gulenists in the Army, which went as far as staging a coup, could not have come to be if it were not for the significant support of the AKP government.

    When the meeting of the National Security Council took place on August 25th 2004, the AKP was in its second year of governance. As you know, the Security Council is made up of High Ranking Army Officers, and members of the Council of Ministers, who come together to discuss subjects concerning the security of the State. Their assessments are not binding but accepted as a recommendation. The recommendations are kept secret.

    However, in 2004 the recommendation of the Security Council was known for quite some time.

    It made the headlines in the Taraf daily newspaper, well known for its contribution to the making of today’s Turkey.

    The news on the Security Council was released at the time when we heard about the beginning of the fight between the AKP and Gulen. And already there were signals that this battle would become violent.

    The meeting of the National Security Council took place 12 years before the failed coup of July 15th. The subject of that meeting referred to the future dangers of the Gulen Sect. Thus, the Military command present at the meeting made a recommendation to the government entitled: “The measures needed to be taken against the activities of the Fethullah Gulen Sect,” advising the AKP to prepare an action plan against the Gulenists.

    The recommendation was signed by the then President of the Republic Necdet Sezer, the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül, five other Cabinet Ministers, the Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces Hilmi Özkök, and the other members of the National Security Council such as Force Commanders of the Army Aytaç Yalman, Özden Örnek, Ibrahim Firtina and Şener Eruygur.

    The proposal put forward by the Military suggested that the activities of the Gulen Sect, both at home and abroad, should be closely monitored and radical measures should be taken against the Organization in light of future threats. I remind you that amongst the signatories, three Force Commanders were detained during the machinated trials, and I will continue to relate what the government did.

    Upon the publication of the news in the daily Taraf, followed by the reactions of the conservative constituency of the AKP voters, the government made several declarations. The common thread of these statements was that the resolutions were mere suggestions which the government completely ignored and had no intention of implementing. Yalçın Akdoğan, the Chief Advisor to the Prime Minister of that time Twitted:” The government has declared null and void the 2004 decisions of the National Security Council, no Cabinet decision has been made, and no action has ever been taken. The then Deputy Prime Minister, Bülent Arınç declared: “In the last ten years not one of the suggested recommendations has been implemented, and we would never do anything to upset religious people or religious sects. In fact, thanks to us, the National Security Document has become totally meaningless.” The statement that Arinç made with reference to the National Security Policy Document is important, since this Document named the domestic and foreign groups who were a threat to the nation. In 2010 the Gulen Sect was listed in this document as one of the local groups threatening national security. However, as mentioned by Arınç, the Gulen Sect was explicitly removed from the list by the AKP government.

    Cevat Öneş, a former Undersecretary of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), with regards to the government ignoring the recommendations of the National Security, made the following observation: “In spite of the various motives mentioned, the fact that the government of that time, did not consider taking political and legal measures, concerning the recommendations of 2004, allowed the Gulen Sect to speed up the takeover not only of the Army but also of the State institutions of the Turkish Republic.”

    Öneş, who was a high-level official of the National Intelligence Organization, pointed out that the AKP government was one of the key responsible for allowing a fundamentalist organization to take over the State. The evidence is the statement given by the AKP, which at the same time is an admission of their guilt.

    Until they became the target of the Gulen Sect, the AKP did not listen to the warnings or the criticisms, and they handed over the State with all its institutions to these criminals. Now the partners in crime want us to believe that they have been “deceived.”

    You have not been deceived. On the contrary, you have tried to deceive together.

    While we have been repeating these facts for years, the Turkish judiciary launched a meaningless attempt trying to establish that the daily Cumhuriyet was a terror organization and us the followers of the Gulen Sect. On the other hand, I would like to point out, that the statement of the partners in crime “we have been deceived” was satisfactory for the judiciary who saw no need to investigate the suspects any further.

    Let us see now how the AKP government handed over the judiciary to the Gulen Sect. I will refer again to the report prepared by the CHP after the failed coup of July 16th.

    After the unsuccessful coup attempt, thousands of judges and prosecutors were dismissed and many of them arrested for being part of the FETÖ organization. Until then, the Gulenists had considerable power in the judiciary.

    The CHP report contains striking findings regarding the staffing of the expelled members of the judicial administration. The report indicates that after the coup, amongst the members of the judiciary expelled by statutory decrees, the seniority in the length of service shows that 1980 is the earliest year they joined service. From 1980 until 2002, when the AKP came to power, various governments appointed in total 7 thousand 672 judges and prosecutors. Amongst them, 1 thousand 210 were dismissed after the coup. In other words, during 23 years approximately 16% had an alleged connection to FETÖ.

    Now let us look at the years after the AKP came to power.

    The report defines the years between 2003 and 2010 as the AKP’s first term. During this period 3 thousand 637 judges and prosecutors were appointed, and 1 thousand 255 were expelled. Regarding the percentage, this means that approximately 35% of the total was dismissed. The Ministers of Justice of the time were Cemil Çicek, Mehmet Ali Şahin, and Sadullah Ergin.

    The report investigated what they called AKP’s second term, which covers the period after the Constitutional referendum of 2010, where a demagoguery discourse advocated the end of the State tutelage on the judiciary, and the corruption probe of 17/25 December 20013. The Ministers of Justice at that time are again Sadullah Ergin and Bekir Bozdağ. While these two Ministers were in office, 2 thousand 876 judges and prosecutors were appointed, and 1 thousand 192 were later expelled. This is nearly 42% of the total.

    The third term examined covers the period from 2014, after the end of the partnership between the AKP and the Gulen Sect, until the coup of July 15th, 2016. The Justice Minister is again Bekir Bozdağ. By then the fight between these former associates had intensified, and therefore there was a visible drop in the share of judges appointed by the Gulenists. Of the 2 thousand 281 appointed judges and prosecutors, 582 were dismissed. That is approximately 26% of the total.

    If we compare the totality of the figures during these three terms of the AKP: between 1980 and 2002, that is during 23 years, the recruitment of the Gulen Sect in the judiciary was approximately 16%. While between 2003-20016, that is during 14 years of AKP’s uninterrupted governance, this percentage went up to 35%. Throughout these 14 years AKP appointed 8 thousand 794 judges and prosecutors of which 3 thousand 29 were purged. The ratio between the totality of the appointed members of the judiciary and those purged for ties with the FETÖ organization is of 35%.

    Even the ratio of expulsions for the period after 17/25 December 2013, which the AKP government declared to be a milestone in an attempt to exempt itself from crime during the investigations against FETÖ, is above average compared to the years between1980-2002. Before concluding this chapter, I want to open a parenthesis on Bekir Bozdağ, who until last week was the Minister of Justice.

    Bekir Bozdağ is one of the 4 appointed Ministers for Justice during AKP’s 14 years of rule. In a speech delivered in Parliament on March 24th, 2011, mentioning Fethullah Gulen he said: “He is an esteemed wise man raised in our country.” On June 9th, 2012, he Twitted from his private account: “Greetings from Antalya Venerable Hoca Efendi! (Fethullah)”. When questioned about the infiltration of the judiciary by religious sects in a program on CNN TV channel he replied: “This is definitely not possible.” And at the beginning of their dispute with the Gulen Sect, he Twitted:” They are trying to set us against each other, but they will not succeed.”

    Bekir Bozdağ’s adventure as Justice Minister, who on the infiltration of the judiciary said: “It is not possible,” goes back to 2013 and continues until today. During these 4 years and until the coup of June 15th, Bekir Bozdağ appointed in total 3 thousand 614 judges and prosecutors. In other words, during the 14 years of AKP governance, of the 8 thousand 794 in total appointed by the government in the judiciary, 41% were recruited by Bozdağ during only 4 years. And of these, 1 thousand 228 judges and prosecutors, in other words nearly 34%, were purged for allegedly being part of the FETÖ organization. These figures and percentages show that:

    Bekir Bozdağ is one of the main responsible for handing over the judiciary to the Gulenists.

    However, while we are in jail accused of being part of the FETÖ conspiracy, Bekir Bozdağ until last week was still the Minister of Justice, and as such was heading the Board of Judges and Prosecutors and was in charge of purging the members of the judiciary he had appointed.

    We shall now look at the National Intelligence Organization and at Hakan Fidan, the Undersecretary of the Turkish Intelligence, who on July 15th, was unable to stop the attempted insurgency even though he had been informed several hours earlier.

    Emre Taner, a former Undersecretary of the National Intelligence, was one of those who testified at the Investigating Commission on the aborted coup of July 15th.

    In his deposition, the retired Undersecretary Taner referred to the period between 2005-2010 when he was in office and made the following statement:

     

    “When I was Undersecretary of the MIT (Turkish National Intelligence) the infiltration of MIT by the Gulen Sect was virtually nil. No recruitment took place without careful assessment. I cannot answer for what followed. The administration after my retirement is accountable for all changes. Now when we are told that 70 to 80 members of the Intelligence have been expelled for Gulenist connections, one cannot but find this odd. Looking at the past one could assume that perhaps 2,3, or at most 5 individuals would be Gulenist. To this I have no objection. Although the general impression is that recent recruitments have been negligent, I can confidently say that amongst the state institutions MIT is the least infiltrated by the Gulenists or any other subversive group.

    The former Undersecretary of the National Intelligence Taner, is openly accusing the present Undersecretary Hakan Fidan of negligence. But let us examine if his impression with regards to the MIT being “the least infiltrated of all state institutions” by the Gulenists reflects the reality.

    The Undersecretary of MIT Hakan Fidan did not even or was not allowed to testify in front of the Parliamentary Investigation Commission of July 15th 2016. Upon request, he submitted a report on MIT personnel connected to the Gulen Sect. The content of this report has been published on the news portal of Odatv by Müyesser Yildiz, my “partner in crime”, accused and imprisoned like me for being part of the Ergenekon organisation, a plot orchestrated by the Gulenists..

    According to the MIT report, in the 2.5 years between December 17th, 2013 and July 15th, 2016, proceedings were started against 181 members of this “clean institution” and against a further 377 after the coup attempt. In other words, a Gulenist connection was established regarding 558 members of this administration. Of the 558, about 70 either resigned or were dismissed. 272, which were sent to the army or the security forces on a temporary assignment, were also fired. In total 509 MIT personnel were expelled, proceedings pursued for 49, while 5 were reinstituted. There is no information on how many of these 558 were employed after 2010, the year Hakan Fidan was appointed as MIT Undersecretary. But I will refer here to the accusations of the former Undersecretary Emre Taner’s against Hakan Fidan regarding the infiltration of the Gulenists in the National Intelligence when Fidan was in office.

    Prime Minister Binal Yildirim also voiced doubts concerning Undersecretary Hakan Fidan.

    Let me recount.

    It is now common knowledge that in his deposition at the investigation of the Ankara Chief Prosecutor, informer Major O.K., said that on July 15, 2016 at 14.00 he had notified the National Intelligence that a coup was to take place on that same day. But Undersecretary Hakan Fidan insists that this information did not refer to an uprising. The Chief of Staff Hulusi Akar supported Fidan’s version by confirming that the Undersecretary had come to the Headquarters claiming that a there was a plot to kidnap him and that they would use the Air Force to do so. Although General Akar declared that “We assessed this was part of a larger operation”, tanks appeared in the streets only some 7 hours after the 2 o’clock warning and Jets bombed the Parliament. The coup failed, but 250 citizens were killed by the putschists. All this because it was not understood that the plan to kidnap the Undersecretary of the Intelligence was part of an uprising.

    Or this is what we are expected to believe?

    And now, because I express these doubts, I am in prison. As for those who admit they had not grasped the magnitude of the planned putsch, they are still at the helm of the army and the National Intelligence.

    It is common knowledge that Hakan Fidan was unreachable for several hours. Furthermore, the reason why Undersecretary Fidan did not warn either the Prime Minister or President Erdogan of the likelihood of a putsch remains a mystery. Let us note that in the past President Erdogan described Hakan Fidan as “The guardian of my secrets.”

    On the evening of August 2, 2016, Prime Minister Binali Yildirim was interviewed both on the television channels of CNNTurk and Kanal D where he said: “I have asked the Undersecretary of MIT why I was not informed. How come that both the Prime Minister and the President were not made aware of a possible coup? Informing the Chief of Staff is normal, but you should have notified the Prime Minister as well. Fidan could not reply.” In other words, the Prime Minister implied that the argument whereby the National Intelligence lacked accurate information was not a convincing one.

    A year later, Prime Minister Yildirim gave another interview which increased our suspicions. This interview with Fikret Bila was published in a supplement of the daily Hurriyet with the heading “One year after the coup of July 15th”. In this interview Yildirim relates how he realized they were faced with a coup attempt following talks with the Security in Ankara and Istanbul. After stressing the fact that he was able to communicate with Undersecretary Fidan only 2 hours after the beginning of the aborted coup attempt, that is between 10.30-11.00, the Prime Minister added:

    “No information was given either to the President or to me. The Undersecretary did not inform me and did not mention anything related to the coup. I did ask him: a coup is under way, what measures have you taken? He answered: ‘Nothing is going on, everything is normal. We are working on it’. But something unusual was happening.

    Let us now look at what happened during the hours when Undersecretary Fidan told the Prime Minister that “everything was normal”.

    21.00: The putschists take control of the Headquarters of the Army, they capture the Commanding officers, start fighting with those who resist. Shots are heard.

    22.00: More shots are heard coming from the Army Headquarters, and firing from a combat helicopter directed at the personnel on the ground.

    22.05: In spite of the no-fly order given by the Chief of Staff, jets zoom over Ankara breaking through the sonic barrier.

    22.28: Tanks in Istanbul close the bridges on the Bosphorus.

    22.35: The putschists occupy the Istanbul Ataturk and Sabiha Gokcen airports.

    All this built up was first shared on social media, then shortly after broadcasted on national TV channels. Just after the conversation between Prime Minister Yildirim and Undersecretary Fidan, combat helicopters attacked MIT headquarters in Ankara at 00.02. But, as Hakan Fidan told the Prime Minister, “everything was normal!”

    As the Prime Minister said, something unusual was happening. And it was indeed. So, we will continue to investigate this “unusual” business. Everyone has the right to know where lies the truth, not the least the bereaved parents of those who risked and lost their lives in order to prevent the coup attempt.

    There is no doubt that one of the strongholds of the Gulen Sect within the State is the Police Department. A major proof of this statement is the emerging role that the members of the police affiliated to this organization played in the investigations and the trials of the conspiracy plots known as Ergenekon, Balyoz, Devrimci Karargah (Revolutionary headquarters), KCK,(Kurdish) Şike( match-fixing), Oda TV and similar.

     

    After the failed coup attempt of July 15th more than 13 thousand police officers were dismissed due to alleged connections with the Gulen Sect. Most of them were arrested. However, we need to underline the fact that the number of officers who are part of the Gulen Sect is much higher than the one mentioned here.

     

    The infiltration of the police force by the Gulen Sect started in the 1980s. Therefore, AKP is not the only political party responsible for this development. Nevertheless, the AKP government did close their eyes on the Gulenists leaked exam questions to the candidates in their preparatory schools. Furthermore no rigorous investigation of these misgivings was undertaken, and criticisms were ignored. This makes AKP solely accountable for this unrelenting infiltration.

     

    Let me give some examples:

    On August 26th 2007, the police officer admission tests were stolen before the exam. More than 71 thousand candidates from all over Turkey sat for the exam. When the leak was discovered there were repercussion in the media and allegations that the key to the tests were given before the exam to some of the applicants, implying the followers of the Gulen Sect. Beşir Atalay, the Interior Minister of that time argued that it was not possible to know the exam questions in advance or that they were given to some of the candidates.

    -8 months later, Beşir Atalay’s assertive statement was refuted. The exam questions of the Police Academy was leaked to the FEM preparatory schools owned by the Gulen Sect and serviced to some students with key answers, on September 13th, 2009. This scandal was uncovered by the media, and the exam, where more than 60 thousand candidates had taken part, was cancelled.

     

    There was also proof that widespread cheating took place during the exam held on March 5th, 2012. This exam was originally held by the General Directorate of Security in order to meet the shortage of intermediate officers. More than 50 thousand police officers took this exam. 68 of the candidates who passed were related to each other As for the 485 who held positions in the section of the police where the Gulen Sect was the strongest – like the departments for Personnel recruitment, Intelligence, Anti-smuggling, the Directorate for the Protection of the Prime Minister and the Office of the Private Secretaries of various Ministries, had scored between 85-9O points at the exam. It became apparent that in same exam of 2011 the participants who passed with high scores had given all the wrong answers except for 19 questions and this was established by a court ruling.

    In the 1980s the Gulen Sect was recruiting its adherents amongst the students of the Police Academy. And during the AKP government, they would give their followers the exam questions beforehand thus facilitating their entrance in the police force.

     

    These wrongful activities were subject to complaints and reported in the media but the AKP government chose to disregard the objections.

     

    It is only after December 17/25, 2013 and the corruption charges launched by the Gulenists against the government that the AKP government started judiciary and administrative investigations on the contested exams.

     

    We have witnessed an attempted coup where the perpetrators were shooting at their own people, we have looked at the Army, the Judiciary, the Police Department, the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) and at the responsibility of the AKP government. We have summarized a situation, but this is only the tip of the iceberg.

     

    This much is clear: during the 14 years of the AKP governance the Gulen Sect advanced towards its ultimate goal without difficulty. Moreover, despite the MIT investigation of February 7, 2012, which brought to light their intentions towards AKP and the investigations on the corruption charges of December 17/25 2013, the Gulenists retained and increased their gains within the system without having to face any real obstacle. One single quotation summarizes the government’s response to criticisms and warnings of the growing danger. On February 2012 in an interview on NTV Channel, the then AKP Deputy Chairman, Hüseyin Çelik, reacted to criticism of the Gulen Sect’s power inside the state institutions as follows: ”They say that the Gulenists infiltrated and seized the State. This is a joke. Let us put an end to this paranoia.”

     

    There is one last story I would like to mention. In 2011 the Gulen Sect was at the height of its power. The members of the AKP government, the majority of the media, and the vast majority of the judiciary – who today are imprisoning vast numbers in order to prove they are active enemies of the Gulenists – none of them dared to mention Fethullah Gulen or his Sect. They saw their benefit in deference to the State’s powerful force, the Gulen Sect. Just as they surrender today to Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the AKP. Back then, I was amongst those arrested because of a Gulenist conspiracy. There again the reason was my professional activity as it is today. I was working on a book investigating the organization of the Gulen Sect in the police and the judiciary during the Ergenekon investigation and on the extended role played by the Sect during this trial.

     

    At a time when everybody was afraid, when you could not mention Gulen’s name and compliance to the Sect was prevailing, the name of my book was ” “The Imam’s Army”. (Imamin Ordusu”)

     

    Recep Tayyip Erdogan was then Prime Minister and he used to say ”Some books are more dangerous than bombs”. Referring to the journalists in prison he declared like he often does even now: “They are not journalists, they are terrorists.” Not that we have any expectations, but had Erdogan gone beyond his perception of books, writers and journalists as criminals, and instead read, listened, tried to understand most of us would probably not be here today. Moreover, had Erdogan been someone that reads, he would be aware of what Salvator Allende told the fascists Junta in Chile: “History is on our side and it is those who are right that write history.”

     

    Yes, once again history is on our side. So you will not be able to create an illegal organisation from the Cumhuriyet newspaper or make terrorists out of us.

     

    At this stage you must have understood this from what I’ve told you so far. Mine is neither a defense nor a deposition. On the contrary, it is an accusation. Because;

     

    The fact that the Indictment is stated in the heading of what is a political operation does not go beyond a shameful joke. And bearing the title of “judge or prosecutor” does not make jurists out of the members of this political operation

     

    This operation engaged against us is nothing but a pogrom targeting freedom of thought and expression and freedom of the press. And some members of the judiciary have assumed the task of being the lynch mob of this pogrom.

     

    In advanced democracies, the norms of the rule of law prevail and justice is regulated accordingly. In Turkey, some members of the judiciary have become the gravediggers of justice. We witness a dictatorial aspiration to institutionalize a system that undermines the rule of law, where the intellectual and political squalor of the judiciary is not surprising.

    The Turkish judiciary has been presently stripped of all principles of human rights, justice, conscience and merit. We are therefore aware that you are deaf to calls for humanity, rights, justice or legality. Therefore, I have no requests. I will limit myself by saying that the gowns you are wearing as a protective shield are held together by human lives and freedom.

    The organisation you are attempting to find in the Cumhuriyet newspaper is the one ruling the country disguised as a political party. The media that is “His master’s voice” is serving lies as truth to the public. They spread the organization’s propaganda by covering up and making crimes commonplace.

    We are faced with a well-known truth: crime is the most powerful glue in the world.

    This glue is binding the political power, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the plundering financial capital and “His master’s voice” the media.

    Those who assume that this dynasty of crime, this dirty system will last forever are mistaken. All dictatorships darken the pages of history with greed and hate, while preparing their own end. They pave roads that lead to their own damnation and at the end nothing will remain of their arrogance or their conceit.

    There is no doubt that the siege established by this organization will collapse. Because in this country:

    • Despite the enemies of democracy, there are those who fight for a sustainable and expansive democracy.
    • Despite those who crush justice, there are those who defend the supremacy of law.
    • Despite those who glorify war and death to preserve their profits, there are those who struggle to make peace and life indispensable.
    • Despite child murderers and protectors of pedophilia, there are those who work to turn children’s dreams into reality.

     

    • And despite those who want to stifle the truth, there are those who still work as journalists.

    I have nothing more to say with regards to an organization which aims to criminalize my journalistic activities. I will repeat that in no way this is to be considered a defense. I would think this assumption to be an insult to the ethics of my profession.

    Journalism is not a crime. Totalitarian regimes have in common the criminalization of journalistic activities. Thus, in every period and under every government I managed to be the offender of the law. I am proud to leave this legacy to my daughter.

    I am aware that this government and its judiciary have issues with me. The reason is that unlike what is now prevailing in Turkey, as a journalist I believe in the power of reporting the truth and acting independently.

    In countries like Turkey where the ties to democracy are weak, and where the government is increasingly moving towards a totalitarian regime, to be a journalist is to cross the line. But journalism cannot be exercised by following orders. And those who do cannot be called journalists.

    So as a journalist yesterday, I am still one today and will remain as such even tomorrow. Therefore, the uncompromising conflict between us and those who want to suppress the truth will continue.

    This is why in these days of darkness what we need is more truth, not less. And I will continue to work resolutely for that purpose.

    A price to pay is inevitable. But do not assume that this frightens us. Neither my admirable colleagues of “Journalists Outside (Dışardaki Gazeteciler) nor are afraid of any one of you. Because we know that what frightens tyrants the most is courage.

     

    Oppressors should be aware that no brutality can prevent the progress of history.

     

    Down with tyranny, long live liberty!

     

    Applause…

     

    PJ (Presiding Judge) – What are you doing? This is no place for a show.

    SPECTATOR- Who is shouting?

    PJ- I am shouting, the Presiding Judge is. You are disturbing the order of the court. Everything went well up to now, there is no need for this.

    PJ- My first question to you is this: you spoke of journalism. This of course is the subject of the trial here, an important part of the suspects are journalists. Does journalism include unlimited freedom?

    Ahmet Şık- There are of course universal rules defining the limits of journalism. But journalism is not determined within the framework of professional rules. To a great extent …. All Professional organizations determine a series of rules in their own field and make these known to their professionals, they advise them to abide by these rules. But unfortunately as concerns Professional organizations in Turkey, legal sanctions are quite insufficient. What determines the limits of journalism is this: is there a problem with the journalist’s relating the truth? That is to say, is he telling the truth or is he telling lies? And is he upholding public interest? That’s all. Everything that upholds public interest and tells the truth without twisting and turning its objectivity is news.

    PJ- You interpret the only limit as being public interest and objectivity (Ahmet Şık interrupts the PJ at this point)

    Ahmet Şık – But here it is important to stress something else. A journalist does not champion war. I am giving you personal examples but there are very hierarchical rules at play here. A journalist does not allow for sexism in his work, he draws a line between himself and fascism, he keeps a distance with power elites. His relations are limited to his sources etc. etc. I mean we can speak here of a whole lot of ethical values which are universally accepted but the limits drawn here are confined to certain preventive measures against pinpointing certain people in society as targets or turning them into hate objects. These are the limits but the most important one is being against war. (Journalism) has to adopt the language of peace not that of war. It is about making news pieces which side with democracy and which uphold the virtues of democracy, in defiance to those who want to strangle it. It involves keeping away from sexism with regard to different individuals, to different sexual identities, taking care not to turn them into hate objects, etc.

    PJ – Now you have stressed something in what you have just said. You said that it is important to revere peace and life.

    Ahmet Şık – Yes

    PJ – That they must be revered

    Ahmet Şık – Absolutely

    PJ – Your other writings are not of interest to us in the indictment. The ones taken up in the indictment are limited to a total of five articles published first on March 14, 2015, continued on March 31, 2015 and completed on April 1st, 2015. Do you believe that these articles revere peace and life?

     

    Ahmet Şık- You see, you cannot say the same thing for every news piece. How could that be possible? For example if your are doing a piece on the rising price of smoking, how can you find a link between that and revering peace and life? That is not possible, no.

    PJ – What I am talking about here are specific articles.

    Ahmet Şık – But it is not possible to pose such questions with regard to specific articles. But if you ask me, what we can do is this. I do not remember the articles for which I am accused here. Unfortunately I did read that indictment. I read it countless times. And I did not know what to do. To be frank, I had no intention of pronouncing a single word until I came here today. Because, you see. I’ve been in journalism for the last 27 years, I’ve been put on trial many times and do believe me, I’m saying this sincerely, I am sick and tired of having to explain to the Turkish judiciary what freedom of opinion and expression is, what freedom of the press is. Excuse me but those who are going to join the Turkish judiciary and work there, do obtain law degrees.

    PJ – With regard to explaining this to the Turkish judiciary … (unintelligible)

    Ahmet Şık – They know what the articles in national and international treaties and conventions are about but regarding what freedom of the press is, what freedom of opinion and expression is, what the limits defined by the European Convention of Human Rights – which you have signed – are, there is a shortcoming which is insistently not done away with. If you wish you can ask your question based on each of those articles, by pointing out what expression in them have caught your attention and then I can try to answer you.

    PJ – I am not the only one whose attention was caught, it is because they caught the attention of those who prepared the indictment as well.

    Ahmet Şık – You shouldn’t -and I’m saying this in all sincerity- take that indictment too seriously (Laughter in the hall)

    PJ – Your are free not to answer. Your article dated February 14, 2015 and titled “Either Apo goes to Kandil, or we go to Imrali” where there is an interview of Cemil Bayık, let’s start with that. Does this come into the scope of your publishing principles, of the concept of revering peace and life, as well as of the answer to the question ‘is journalism about unlimited freedom’?

    Ahmet Şık – My answer to all of this is Yes. That article was penned within the ethical limits defined by journalism. The interview was carried out without twisting and thwarting the truth, by emphasizing that the words attributed to the subject of the interview were noted as he expressed them, with nothing added nor taken out, except for a few grammatical corrections. This is a news piece which points out to the truth without distorting objective reality in any manner. But if you have found an expression or a term in that piece which has to do with your question, do ask me about that and we can look into it, but I claim that this is not the case.

    PJ – Alright. Now the article dated July 8, 2015, titled “Ours is journalism, yours is treason”

    Ahmet Şık- Do excuse me, I’d like to come back to the previous question first. Now do allow me to say this: the reason why that interview you referred to was brought up in the indictment to accuse me was not the interview itself. In fact there is another piece of news in that interview which was meticulously omitted in the indictment. During that interview Cemil Bayık said something, inadvertently I believe. You will remember that a woman, claimed to be a high rank leader of the PKK, was assassinated in Paris. (Bayık) said that Hakan Fidan had informed them -this was during the period when a series of negotiations were going on- that the assassination was carried out by a group within the MIT (Turkish National Intelligence Organization-tr. note). This caught my attention but I did not insist on probing it. If I had he would have tried to correct that information he had blurted out. When I came back I transcribed the tapes, I wanted to be sure I had heard right and yes, these were his exact words. I did this news piece and the real news which made the headlines was this. Our lawyers can find that edition of the newspaper for you. That news piece was based on that information and the government was greatly annoyed by it. The intention in including that article in the indictment is to accuse me of having ties with an organization of some kind, which I reject, and of doing propaganda. There is nothing in the interview which recalls violence, which exalts or exhorts violence whatsoever and I claim that this cannot be found in any piece I have published up to this day.

    I have been a journalist for 27 years and I am proud to say that not a single piece I have written has been refuted up to now. In a period when so many lies are all the rage, this stands out as a monument of pride. As I said, what brought that interview up in the indictment is the fact that a group of people within the MIT, that is within the State, were involved in an assassination in Paris while the State was carrying out negotiations. The said group of MIT people, a group of some wrong people, together with, as you know, some other people, members of a violent organization, was involved in this assassination, I believe with a view to undermine that (negotiation) process. One flank of the State comes up with a political solution proposal to what has become a gangrened issue in Turkey and holds peace negotiations, while another flank organizes an assassination against three people of the organization. Now that makes news wherever you are in the World, and it is a noteworthy piece of news and that’s what I did.

    PJ – What do you mean by ‘violent organization’?

    Ahmet Şık – I am speaking about the PKK.

    Prosecutor – Another interview on July 8, 2015, titled “Ours is journalism, yours is treason” . Prosecutor Özcan Şişman’s text figures in the indictment: but did not share that information”. Özcan Şişman shared this information with you and this is in the form of an interview through letters.

    Ahmet Şık- This is an interview carried out through letters. I transmitted my questions to him through his lawyer, he answered them and sent them to me. It was then that the news appeared in the paper.

    PJ – In fact we know that journalists always confirm certain things. Did you have chance to confirm (that information)? I am not asking you about your source. Just to revise

    Ahmet Şık – What did I have to confirm?

    PJ – The shared information: “The MIT knew about the massacre in Reyhanlı”.

    Ahmet Şık – I am trying to understand you when I ask this question: According to you, who could have been the instance to confirm such information?

    Prosecutor – But you just said you had sources.

    Ahmet Şık- There is no interlocutor there. What can they say? Do you believe that they can say something like “Yes, I took part in an operation which killed my own citizens”?

    PJ – If you were curious enough, you would have asked them directly.

    Ahmet Şık – Look, I started investigating ISIS. And it was directly linked to the news piece I mentioned to you. I got together some files and some news pieces to write a book. There is no harm in my telling this story here and it will be a bit funny but up to then, that is up to 2014, I had no contact with the MIT. I have no idea how to get in touch with them anyway. Naturally, I first looked into MIT’s web page, there was no phone number. So I called some journalist colleagues in Ankara. When I told one of them that I wanted to meet with Hakan Fidan, that I needed his phone number, he started laughing. “Hey, what do you know, Ahmet Şık is looking fort he MIT’s phone number, and he is asking me, of all people, for it.” Anyway, he gave me the number of the press counsel, the official number and that’s how I put in a call to the MIT. Can I make myself understood? There are some news which require no confirmation or when there is a piece of news which requires confirmation, the people to confirm it will not tell you the truth anyway. The person interviewed there was also a member of the judiciary, wearing the same frock as yourselves. Later on he was prosecuted. The reason for the prosecution is related to the period he served as prosecutor. It was a period when some tricky and terrible events were taking place and he was the prosecutor for those cases. He made some allegations about that (the news piece). Now, it is clear who made the allegations, I am only transmitting them. That’s all.

    PJ – You have another news piece on February 13,2015, with the heading “The TIR mystery resolved”. You wrote that those arms were not destined to the Turkmens, but to the jihadist organization Ansar Al Islam. This news piece of yours was also included in the indictment. If you wish to say anything on this, you may.

    Ahmet Şık – I would rather you ask your question because what can I say? What I can say is this: I am proud of this piece of news because it was true. That is what I have to say, but if you ask me a question, I’ll try to answer it.

    PJ – I am reiterating the previous question. In fact this point is debated in some other court cases as well and it also comes up in our indictment. Did you confirm this piece of news with your sources? This is my exact question to you.

    Ahmet Şık – I am asking you in all sincerity, have you read that news piece? Don’t misunderstand me, I’m really curious to know if you have read it, because the source is clearly stated in the news piece. This is a news piece based on legal intercepted call recordings which figure in the files of a court case concerning an investigation carried out by the State regarding a certain massacre.

    PJ- What I am asking your is whether you only took into consideration the recordings? Or did you have the information confirmed by other sources? That’s what I am asking you.

    Ahmet Şık – I got in touch with every single person who was mentioned in that news piece. I asked every person whose phone number I was able to find and whom I was able to reach…

    PJ – That is precisely what I am asking you.

    Ahmet Şık – …About the allegations made against them. I told them that some of their utterances in this sense figured in the intercepted calls and asked them whether they had anything to say on this. There were people who did answer, I do not know whether they were included in the file but we published all of them in the paper anyway. There was only one person who did not reply, and then he tried to bring up a ridiculous court case (against us?) which resulted in a decision of non-prosecution.

    1. J. – On March 31, 2015, you made an interview with those involved in the killing of a prosecutor by two militants in Istanbul and published it in the cumhuriyet.com.tr site under the title of “Striking statements.” My first question on this subject is the following: Now do you believe this contributes in any way to the revering of peace and life?

    Ahmet – If you read the questions in the interview, you shall see for yourself that this is what I am striving at. I can read them one by one if you like.

    1. J. – We do not believe there was such an effort.

    Ahmet – I beg of you, please read the questions I asked. Don’t take the answers into consideration. Read those questions and let’s decide all together.

    1. J. – Secondly… Let’s change places if you please.

    Ahmet – This seems to me to be linked to the political atmosphere. That won’t do. I mean, as I said, not in this political climate.

    1. J. – This is my second question: Do you think this news piece serves any social purpose?

    Ahmet – I am quite convinced it does. Look, I stand behind every piece of news I have published until today. just as I stand behind every word I have uttered. Whatever I say, whatever I talk about reflects the way I live. I therefore stand by that news piece. I hope such a thing never happens, but if it did I would want to give the news the same way. For one of the questions I was trying to find an answer to during this short telephone conversation was why, for what motif, should a person in a world metropolis like Istanbul want to stick a gun to a prosecutor’s head and then kill him. If we do not get to understand this by questioning and establishing the cause and effect relation involved, but resort instead to some provocative titles or writings or drawings that exploit nationalistic feelings, we will never solve the problem and these acts will continue to take place. This is my whole concern.

    This is true anywhere in the world but I want to make something clear. Neither do I have any crime to hide behind any flag, nor do I have any sin to hide behind any sacred book. This news was one of them. Let no one find himself a mission and try to invent a crime. I repeat, please read the questions I asked again. We can then talk again. As you wish.

    1. J. – Well I asked my question and got an answer, the rest is of little importance…. Concerning the content of the news piece you published on April 4, 2015, in the Cumhuriyet newspaper, this time in the paper version…

    Ahmet – I’m sorry to interrupt you but… You are now pointing out to something. You talk about a news piece that appeared on the Cumhuriyet.com.tr site… I feel the need to explain and clarify something. I am a journalist working for the printed version of the Cumhuriyet newspaper. My job is to write news pieces, take photographs, make interviews and pursue my professional activities. The news pieces are published in the printed version, as is the case for all those who work at Cumhuriyet.

    1. J. – I will most probably be getting to this point…

    Ahmet – No, no. I want to make something clear. We can continue afterwards. After the news has been published in the newspaper, the news published that day in the newspaper and their related editorials are taken over and discussed and interpreted on the site of the same name. I do not work for cumhuriyet.com.tr, I work for the Cumhuriyet newspaper.

    … to me (unintelligible)

    If this news piece includes an offence, the deadline for the launching of an investigation or trial is of 4 months. That’s all. I’m sorry to say this, but a prosecutor who will insist on reintroducing a case which does not include any cause of offence in the first place and which moreover would have passed its period of limitation if it did include such offence should go back to law school.

    1. J. – Yes, I continue with my question. On April 1, 2015, this news piece appeared on the newspaper’s first page with the following large type size heading: “We did this act because we were obliged to” and was picked up in page 6 with the heading: “The BERKİN ATTACK.” You are the journalist who brought this news piece. My question here has two parts: You have answered the question I have just asked you. There is news value involved. You said for the rest that the news piece fitted the criteria of revering peace and life and benefited the nation.

    What I will ask you now will therefore relate to the second stage of my question. Do you have a say in the way a news piece will be selected, published, the type size used, the choice of including a photograph or not, or its captioning? Is this the job of the editorial board or the chief editor? Give us an answer on this point and then we’ll continue.

    In a newspaper everyone’s job is defined: Photographer journalists take their photographs, journalists write their news pieces, editors write their editorials etc. etc. And all of these are gathered in a kitchen, the editorial board… how these pieces of news will be evaluated will depend on the knowledge and experience of our colleagues working in the editorial board… As a rule, those who come up with the news piece don’t like others to interfere. This is not considered a fair practice. Because everyone’s job is defined. Now if I were to go and … to some news… There is no such job definition, no such task. But I want to underline the following: If any accusation was to come out of this, let me tell you that the whole responsibility for everything mentioned there is mine. I have to say this. I am explaining all this in case you are asking your question in order to understand, but I repeat, if you are to make any accusations, all responsibility lies on me.

  • Speaking Through Silence – Eylem Delikanli

    Speaking Through Silence – Eylem Delikanli

    • I collaborated with artist/activist Aylin Tekiner in an effort to deconstruct “silence” and her art through oral history. (…) Aylin shattered her silence by taking a historic journey to her past and searching for missing pieces about herself and her father.

      – EYLEM DELIKANLI –

    My particular interest in silence and denial within the larger realm of memory studies is driven by the sheer ambition of answering one question: “what breaks silence?” As oral historians, we co-create narratives of various traumatic events and histories in an endless effort to locate these in some particular time in history that would otherwise melt into air. These narratives or testimonies are then curated in various forms to be publicly accessible. Depending on how we define oral history within the larger context, each one of us gears towards community engagement projects, art exhibitions, academia or archival work to achieve our specific goals, be it for social change, co-creating collective memory or even for commercial purposes.

    In May 2016, I collaborated with artist/activist Aylin Tekiner in an effort to deconstruct “silence” and her art through oral history. Our collaboration was then exhibited at the Columbia University OHMA Exhibition in April and was part of a workshop at Oral History Conference in Long Beach, California in October 2016. The intimate space co-created during the interview helped us elaborate Aylin’s life starting from the assassination of her father, Zeki Tekiner in 1980 in Turkey. Silence as a theme emerges in her life story and defines her current artistic work. Aylin shattered her silence by taking a historic journey to her past and searching for missing pieces about herself and her father. Here, I present 4 audio pieces of the longer interview by highlighting the themes of post memory and silence in each episode.

     

    Part 1: ‘Father in Past Tense’

    Marianne Hirsch, in her grandiose work, The Generation of Post Memory[1], captures how memory is transferred to those who are not actually there to live an event and how the act of trans-generational transfer takes place. In this audio piece, Aylin Tekiner details, as a 1,5 generation, how she gathered all the details about her father’s assassination through reading court files and talking to the first hand witnesses. It is important to note that the language she utilizes, which in this case is Turkish, reveals a second layer of understanding about how she verbalizes this constructed memory. Turkish language has two past tenses:

    1. “di” past tense is used when we witness an event in the past and tell about it in the present.
    2. “miş” (sounds mish) past tense is used when we hear about an event from someone else and talk about it in the present.

    Through the first audio piece Aylin starts talking in the “miş” past tense when talking about her father.

    Only the following information, that is about 10”of a 5’45” audio, is based on her own knowledge:

    “I was born on January 18th, 1978 in Nevsehir. I am the last of three kids.”

    The rest of the story is expressed in “miş” past tense that is utilized by a non-witness but told in a detailed fashion and fluidity that a witness would have had. She also switches from “miş” to “di” past tense and vice versa.

     

    Part 2: “Piecing Together”

    Theory of post memory includes components of visuality, be it pictures or other forms of objects. During this audio piece Aylin explains how she first came across newspaper headlines and pictures about her father’s funeral at the age of 5 and how she kept silent about what she discovered.

    In their paper Toward a Science of Silence, Charles B. Stone et al. argue that certain silences, at times, lead to facilitation and silenced memory could potentially be remembered and expressed if appropriate potential cues and situational demands or motives are present.[2] Aylin, in this case, pulled a photographic cue to try to remember how her silence took shape at an early age in her life.

    Stone et al. treat silence not just as the absence of sound but as “the refusal or failure to speak out, refusal and failure to remember.” Their following classification of silence is instrumental in understanding how oral historians can detect mnemonic silences during interviews:

    Four types of silences:

    1. Refusing to remember overtly while remembering covertly
    2. Refusing to remember overtly and covertly
    3. Failing to remember overtly while remembering covertly
    4. Failing to remember overtly and covertly[3]

    A critical moment in Aylin’s narrative is when she talks about the moment of discovering her own silence. She explains this moment as a turning point when a journalist asked about her father’s court case, she then realizes that she does not even know the names of the murderers. She emphasizes that not even the word “murder” was clearly utilized by her family to define what happened to her father. The silence of her family includes mentioning the father only as a “good guy” without mentioning the political nature of this assassination as well as her mother’s deliberate efforts to mask the sad story to provide a happier life for her three children. However, all these efforts of masking and mnemonic silences did not necessarily force Aylin to forget, in contrary, they served as a facilitation for her to strive to discover more about her silent past.

    In his book, The Elephant in The RoomEviatar Zerubavel describes conspiracy of silence as a phenomenon whereby a group of people tacitly agree to outwardly ignore something of which they are personally aware.[4] Once Aylin’s silence was broken triggered by a question posed by a journalist, she rushed into several forms of acts to complete the story by talking to her family, talking to witnesses, searching for the sound of her father through archives as well as searching for the photographs. She describes this urgency as a feeling of sadness and as a fact that all those years nobody made an effort to commemorate him.

     

    Part 3: “Breaking all Silences”

    Politics of denial play an integral part in creating collective silence. How authority controls access to information and media feeds into creating not only silence but also silence of silence, which Zerubavel successfully defines as meta silence. He continues to describe the citizen, who makes the authoritarian regime possible, as someone not speaking, not looking, not asking afterward or not once curious.

    In this third episode, Aylin talks about the meta silence about disappearances and assassinations in Turkey. She shares her experiences at Collective Memory Platform as a member and how that experience affected her in her activism and art. She targeted collective silence around these deaths that were in a way compared to each other in terms of who was worthy of speaking. We hear, in her stories, how social structure of denial prolong the silence and how silence is indeed a collective endeavor.

     

    Part 4: “My Own Voice”

    In the final piece, Aylin talks about her latest art performance “Do all daddies have gray suit?”, a shadow theatre that exemplifies individual and collective silences around her father’s assassination from the perspective of a two-year-old girl.

    When dealing with a traumatic past, do we recognize our own silences? Do we name them as silences? By acknowledging the presence of the elephant in the room, Aylin deliberately focused on various silences in her life to be able to either remember parts of her history or to build what does not exist in her memory. Her next move was to make all these silences “audible and visual” in the public domain. She also undertook collaborative and organized efforts to complete the cycle of “breaking the silence”.

    Before we started our interview, Aylin largely spoke about silence without necessarily defining it in specific terms. Intersubjectivity defines the nature of our work. When our own silences clash with the interviewee’s, a particularly difficult path opens up which, in turn, complicates the flow of the interview. By deconstructing silences and meta silences, we aim to reach the story behind what is presented as the story. In this specific collaboration, it helped both Aylin and me to conceptualize her experience and artistic work under the overarching subject: “silence”.

     

    Footnotes:

    [1] Marianne Hirsch, The Generation of Post Memory, Writing & Visual Culture After the Holocaust, Columbia University Press, New York.

    [2] Charles B. Stone et al, Toward a Science of Silence: The Consequences of Leaving a Memory Unsaid, Perspectives on Psychological Science, Sage Publications, DOI:10.1177/1745691611427303

    [3] ibid

    [4] Eviatar Zerubavel, The Elephant in the Room: Silence & Denial in Everyday Life, Oxford University Press, 2006 (electronic version @Columbia)

  • Frequently Asked Questions

    Frequently Asked Questions

    by Simten Coşar

     

    1. What is Academics for Peace?

     

    Academics for Peace is a group of academics, mainly concerned with the escalation of the conflict between the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and the PKK in Eastern Turkey, and in the scale of violence against civilian population in the region that has always been part of the same conflict. The group was formed by the pro-peace academics in 2012.

     

    1. What is the Peace Declaration?

     

    The Peace Declaration was a statement by the Academics for Peace against the escalation of violence against the Kurdish civilians in the Eastern part of Turkey, due to the rising tension in the conflict between the TAF and the PKK from July 2015 onwards. The Academics for Peace targeted to raise public awareness by directly calling on the Turkish government to take initiative to end the violence. The Declaration, entitled “We Will Not Be A Party To This Crime” (Bu Suça Ortak Olmayacağız) was opened for signature among the academics at national and international levels, and received widespread support at both levels. It was signed by 1128 academics worldwide.

     

    1. What is the significance of January 11, 2016 as a date?

    The Peace Declaration was shared with the general public through a press conference on January 11, 2016. From this date on rights violations against signatories have begun.

     

    As of September 24, 2016, rights violations against “Academics for Peace” employed in private and public universities are listed below:

     

    Public Private Total
    Dismissal* 59 33 92
    Resignation 7 7 14
    Forced Retirement 0 1 1
    Disciplinary Investigation 448 63 511
    Disciplinary investigations. Decision of the Investigation Committee: Dismissal from public service. Pending CoHE (YÖK) approval. 44 5 49
    Preventive suspension* 74 11 85
    Suspension from administrative duty 3 4 7
    Police custody 38 3 41
    Pre-trial detention** 2 2 4
    * Among Peace Petition signatories, 44 faculty members are removed and banned from public service. 1 PhD student who held teaching positions within the Ministry of National Education is suspended from public service. Also, at least 63 PhD students within the Faculty Training Program suffer from rights violations due to changes in the program by government decrees.

    ** 3 academics had to stay in pre-trial detention for 40 days and 1 for 22 days until they were released after the first court hearing.

    Source: https://barisicinakademisyenler.net/node/314

     

    1. So, were the signatories limited to the original group of the Academics for Peace?

     

    Certainly not! The original group of the Academics for Peace was composed of about 200 academics in Turkey. As of January 11, 2016, 1128 academics signed the Peace Declaration. From then on the rapid and persistent governmental measures taken against the signatories blurred the boundaries of the group. But in the general and widest sense all the signatories are now referred to as the Academics for Peace or as the academics asking for peace in the country.

     

    1. Was there any withdrawal from the Peace Declaration?

     

    Of course there were withdrawals due to the immediate and ever-increasing violation of rights of the academics after the Peace Declaration went public. Some signatories could not stand the rapid and rather harsh pressures by their universities; some could not stand the threats to their lives both on the campuses and in any sphere of their everyday life.

     

     

    1. So what is the exact up-to-date number of the signatory academics?

     

    Despite the withdrawals of signatures and never-ending and ever-increasing pressures, harassments, assaults on the signatory academics the number of the academics who signed the Peace Declaration increased to 2212 by the end of January 2016.

     

    1. So, is there an organization, which might be said to represent the academics, who signed the Peace Declaration?

     

    No, there is no organization, which might be said to represent the academics, who signed the Peace Declaration.

     

    1. Are the academics, who signed the Peace Declaration support any terrorist organizations?

     

    No, the academics, who signed the Peace Declaration do not support any terrorist organization.

     

    1. So, are the academics, who signed the Peace Declaration pushed to deal with and encounter the violation of academic rights and freedom on an individual basis?

     

    No, the academics, who signed the Peace Declaration do not have to encounter and endure the violation of academic rights and freedom on an individual basis. They are supported by the Education Union Workers (EĞİTİMSEN), as well as some other academic and/or research organizations at national and international levels.

     

    1. The supports at the national level are for the time being extended mainly in legal and financial terms—certainly insufficient, considering the persistent dismissals, suspensions and bans from public duty.
    2. The supports at the international level are basically through Scholars At Risk (SAR) and Scholar Rescue Fund (SRF), as well as through individual efforts of universities abroad for temporary research and teaching positions. Moreover, many international academic and human rights organizations, including but not limited to the Middle East Studies Association, European Association for Middle East Studies, International Association for Media and Communication Research, International Association for Feminist Economics, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, European Trade Union Committee for Education have expressed their support to the Academics for Peace through press releases. More information about international support can be found here: http://internationalsolidarity4academic.tumblr.com/

     

     

     

    1. Are the academics, who signed the Peace Declaration PKK sympathizers?

     

    No, the academics, who signed the Peace Declaration cannot be categorized as PKK sympathizers.

     

     

    1. Are the academics, who signed the Peace Declaration sympathizers/followers and/or members of the (Fethullah) Gülen movement?

    No, the academics, who signed the Peace Declaration are not sympathizers/followers and/or members of the (Fethullah) Gülen movement.

     

    1. Is there any political stance that might define the academics, who signed the Peace Declaration?

     

    The only common political stance that the academics, who signed the Peace Declaration share is that they opt for peace in Turkey. Otherwise, they differ in terms of their political stance extending from leftists, to feminists, and to liberal-democrats. But the leftists and feminists make up the majority of the signatory academics.

     

    1. What can be done?

    A lot can be done.

    Some possible forms of support are listed by Chad Kautzer here:

     

    • Investigate whether your institution can temporarily host or hire an academic currently at risk in Turkey. Some institutions do this directly and some work with third-party organizations, such as Scholars at Risk [https://www.scholarsatrisk.org]. Your institution can also become a member of the Scholars at Risk Network, supporting their work through annual membership dues.
    • Review any academic or financial relations between your institution and academic institutions in Turkey. These might include joint research projects, grants, or faculty and student exchanges. Such relations can be used as leverage to pressure institutions in Turkey to respect academic freedom.
    • Use the resources of your institution and the public platforms available to you to disseminate knowledge about the plight of academics in Turkey. This could involve, for example, organizing talks, exhibitions, and press conferences, or producing films and publications.
    • Organize and participate in political actions and lobbying campaigns directed at Turkish officials and/or officials in your own government. This might be a protest at the Turkish Embassy, making phone calls, or something more creative. Academics for Peace, for example, has a campaign [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1lnv0iMroEBU-RTkskvy-8R1Yla_FdLYxfVVHIfd2Mg/edit] to send letters to university rectors in Turkey, asking them to reinstate academics fired for political reasons. It is particularly important to lobby officials in the United States and European Union member states, given their deep ties to the Turkish government.
    • Connect with others (both individuals and organizations) who care about this issue, so you can stay informed and motivated. Scholars at Risk, Amnesty International, and the Middle East Studies Association, to name just a few, have email alerts. Like Facebook pages that disseminate news about academics in Turkey and information about actions to support them, such as those of Research Institute on Turkey (RIT) [https://www.facebook.com/ResearchInstituteOnTurkey/?fref=ts] and International Solidarity with Academics in Turkey (ISAT) [https://www.facebook.com/International-Solidarity-with-Academics-in-Turkey-ISAT-1120304684703566/?pnref=story], which I recently created. ISAT also has an email list you can subscribe to by emailing academicsus@gmail.com.
    • Ask your college, university, professional organization, or union to publish a statement supporting academics in Turkey and send it to officials in Turkey and in your own government.

    Here is a letter from the Middle East Studies Association [http://mesana.org/about/board-lettersstatements.html#TurkishHigherEducation] that was endorsed by over 40 professional organizations. You can also create petitions and open letters for others to sign, as with this open letter to U.S. officials [https://goo.gl/N9XwBB] and this international petition [http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/the-purge-of-academic-institutions-in-Turkey] addressed to Turkish officials.

    • Sign the petitions and open letters. Although this is the easiest action to take, it is still important. These petitions and letters can: (a) communicate the depth and breadth of support to media outlets and government officials, (b) encourage academics in Turkey, and (c) serve as organizing tools to build political networks that facilitate future actions.

     

    But new proposals are more than welcome!

  • The Crisis of Development and the Alternatives: Politics of the Commons and the Potentials – Ümit Akçay

    The Crisis of Development and the Alternatives: Politics of the Commons and the Potentials – Ümit Akçay

    In response to the economic and ecological crises which are becoming more and more frequent, more serious questions have emerged about hegemonic notions of development, which are based on the assumption that economic growth, namely the increase in commodity production, may continue forever. The discontent with the hegemonic development approach and the economic policies implemented in line with that approach has become all the more apparent following the global economic crisis which began in the USA in 2008 and has continued up to this date.

    On the other hand, we see that the fundamental problem of the social oppositions which emerged in many regions ranging from the Occupy Street movement in the USA to the social movements in Latin America, from the revolts in the Arab regions to the demonstrations against the austerity policies in Europe and the resistance at Gezi Parkı in Turkey is related to how to turn that social energy into a transformative capacity and to unite these movements around an alternative program. Within this context, it has become all the more important to leave the hegemonic development approach and to discuss alternative policies that aim at surpassing the capitalist social relations, which are the basis for this hegemonic approach.

     

     The “Invention” of Development

    The development of capitalist social relations marks the point in history in which the idea of moving economic growth beyond the limits of nature was brought to the fore. In that regard, capitalist development involves the assumption that economic growth may increase year by year in a linear fashion forever.

    On the other hand, the issue of development was brought to the agenda as the theory of capitalist development came to be used for the countries categorized as “under-developed” under the international economic-political conditions of the post-World War II era. Although focusing on economic growth, this idea of development was constructed in relation to such concepts as “modernization” and “progress” within the period in which it emerged and was based on the belief that the late capitalist countries would catch up with the early capitalist countries if the traditional economies were modernized and industrialized.

    Three fundamental dynamics have been influential in this process which may be called “the invention of development.” The first dynamic was the development of a social system alternative to and opponent of the capitalist system in the USSR and the emergence of the Cold War conjuncture in the post-world war II era. This era witnessed the escalation of the war between the two social systems that competed with each other to have controlling influence over large geographic areas.

    The second dynamic, which needs to be evaluated in relation to the first one, was the process of de-colonization which also started in the post-1945 period. In this process, the previously colonized countries established new nation-states and one of the most important agenda of the Cold War pertained to the question of whether these new nation-states would choose the capitalist or the socialist camp.[2] The third dynamic was the change in the hegemonic understanding of economy following the crisis in 1929. Accordingly, the neoclassical approach to economy, which argues that the freedom of markets would result in economic growth and ensure the effective distribution of resources, was replaced by the Keynesian approach, which suggests that state intervention may be utilized actively to solve the problems which cannot be solved with the free operation of the markets. The legitimation of the state intervention by the Keynesian approach laid the necessary intellectual ground for the emergence of development economics, which argues that systematic state intervention is needed in “under-developed” countries to direct them towards development.[3]

    The fundamental aim of the concept and practices of development that emerged as a result of these three dynamics was to ensure that the late capitalist countries ally with the Western countries and that their economies integrate into the capitalist system. In this context, the concept of development is an invention of the USA to a large extent.[4] However, to the extent that it represented a “common good,” the concept of development was also an important tool of social legitimacy for the political elites engaged in state-making practices in late capitalist countries. The development policies which were practiced in most of the late capitalist countries between the years 1945-1980 were able to be implemented through the three-partite program that evolved in the sphere of legitimacy opened up by Keynesianism. This program was comprised of systematic state intervention, industrialization strategy based on import substitution and development planning.

     

    Neoliberal Development

    The fundamental feature of the development policies implemented between the years 1945-1980 was the systematic state intervention and the creation of the necessary conditions for the accumulation of capital within the domestic market by means of a foreign trade policy based on import substitution. However, when the crisis of the industrialization strategy based on import substitution in late capitalist countries overlapped with the structural crisis caused by the tendency of the rate of profit to fall in the early capitalist countries in 1970s, the hegemonic approach to development underwent a change.

    The dramatic increase in the interest rates aimed at controlling the inflation in the USA triggered the debt crises in the Global South in the early years of 1980s. With the subsequent conditional structural adjustment credits issued by the IMF and the World Bank, the hegemonic approach to development was turned into a market-centered approach negating state intervention. The fundamental properties of this new model that can be called “neoliberal development” may be summarized by the policies of the Washington Consensus. To the extent that it is based on a critique of the previous conception of development, the neoliberal development approach claimed that the interventions to the operation of the market are the fundamental reason for the stagnation of the economic growth. The neoliberal development approach continued to be centered on economic growth and argued that economic growth is to be realized through strategies based on private property and the market rather than public initiatives such as state intervention.[5]

    The 1980s and 1990s were the years in which the neoliberal development policies were implemented in the Global South. The neoliberal approach to development was revised in 2000s when it could not provide the results it promised through the market-based de-regulation policies such as privatization, restricting public services, putting pressure on wages and the liberalization of foreign trade and capital movements. The post-Washington Consensus inspired by the institutionalist economics represents the revisions in neoliberal development. Accordingly, the markets may not be perfect; the state has a regulatory role to play especially with respect to such matters as asymmetric levels of information and externalities.[6] Therefore, pro-market state intervention and regulation was brought to the agenda for the sake of such reforms as developing autonomous regulatory institutions, ensuring the independence of the central bank and strengthening and protecting property rights.[7]

     

    The Crisis of Development

    The implementation of the neoliberal development approach, which is based on the belief that the freedom of the market may solve such problems as economic growth, unemployment, effective distribution of resources or economic crises has led to another wave of commodification in the post-1980 era. This new wave of commodification operated in two ways. The first one operated through the privatization of public enterprises while the second one involved the commercialization of the very logic of public enterprises and their inclusion in market relations. This new wave, called “accumulation by dispossession” by David Harvey[8], pursued an incremental progression well into the 2000s, which were the years in which policies of the post-Washington consensus revised by the institutionalist approach were implemented. Therefore, very little of what was promised to the late capitalist countries was delivered through the discourse and practices of development in the post-1945 era.[9]

    The recent developments in the market-centered approach to development have focused on micro strategies aimed at reducing poverty.[10] In this framework, it is argued that such practices as financial inclusion and its improvement would accelerate economic growth. It is not hard to guess that the financial inclusion policies proposed in the 2000s when personal indebtedness exploded worldwide will lead to further household indebtedness.[11] Therefore, in line with the financialization of economies worldwide, the market-based solutions developed in response to the crisis of development propose a framework which may be defined as “more of the same.”[12]

    The new developmentalist proposals emerged as an alternative to the limitations of the neoliberal argument for a development framework in which the state resumes a more active role by “returning to the origins”[13]  to implement selective industrial policies.[14]  However, the problem with this approach is that it positions the state as the guiding force of this type of development framework at a time when the relative autonomy of the state is increasingly restricted.[15]  The reason is that the state which they call back is not the same as the state of today. Now the state is not simply an active executor of neoliberal policies but is increasingly managed like a company itself.

    In short, the neoliberal and state-centered suggestions, despite being based on different theoretical frameworks and socio-political alliances, both take the capitalist development process for granted and therefore, have not been able to develop satisfying responses to the inequalities and crisis tendencies inherent to this process. This process points to the crisis of development itself. This means that there is an undeniably huge gap between what was promised to late capitalist countries with the invention of the concept of development in the post-1945 era and what has been realized up to this date.

     

    The Alternatives: Politics of the Commons and the Potentials

    Actually, the “crisis of development” is not a new issue. For instance, Escobar claimed in 1990s that the development approach of 1960s came to an end and this concept needed to be re-defined in line with the demands of the newly developing social movements.[16] The suggestion that Escobar made more than 20 years ago is still valid today. Within this framework, the increasing frequency of economic and ecological crises requires a re-evaluation of the thought and practices relating to development through a perspective which questions capitalism, the dominant mode of social organization, and aims at moving beyond it.[17]

    In this context, it is all the more important to think about a framework of social development which aims at surpassing commodity relations to move beyond the current crisis of development. In this framework, the politics of the commons, which is discussed more frequently in the recent period, carries crucial potentials.[18]

    The politics of the commons aims at founding a system of thought and practice which brings to the agenda models of commoning, production and management oriented towards surpassing the divisions between economics and politics or the public and the private. If we are to think within this framework, we need to elaborate on three fundamental columns on which we may build social development models aimed at surpassing commodity relations: democratization of economy, self-government and democratic planning.

    Democracy is used as a concept restricted to the political sphere in the hegemonic approach to development. This construction of democracy assumes that people who are citizens of a country are free as political subjects and are equal before the law. However, when we transfer this concept of democracy restricted to the political sphere, to the economic sphere, we see that the only freedom we have is the “freedom” of private property. That is the root of the problem. When the inequalities established in the economic sphere are not addressed, the political equalities become nothing but hollow concepts. Therefore, the alternative perspective to social development which needs to be developed has to go beyond this apparent division between the economy and politics and to see the economic sphere itself as a site which needs to be democratized.

    When we approach the issue with this framework, we could see that the hegemonic development approach has always had a technocratic content. In this context, the fundamental problem with the hegemonic development perspective is that it prioritizes increasing capital accumulation to the extent that it is based on economic growth. It is inevitable that the accumulation of capital within the capitalist mode of production will increase social inequalities and the economy will continue being a fundamental site in which social inequalities are instituted. Therefore, democratization of the economy is one of the essential components of a politics of the commons aimed at surpassing commodity relations. Accordingly, real democracy may only be instituted if political equality and freedoms are supported by economic ones.[19]

    When we approach the process of democratization of economy more concretely, we have on our agenda the issue of supporting and developing public enterprises which would surpass private property relations, the basis of inequalities in the economic sphere. However, this does not simply mean calling back the state as is the case in new developmentalist approaches. The politics of the commons must simply argue for communization rather than nationalization. The reason is that profit–driven enterprises subjected to market relations would have limited social benefit even if they are owned by the state. Therefore, when the public enterprises are supported, they need to ensure that workers participate in the management of the enterprises in which they work and that they are inspected by the workers themselves together with the expert institutions. Therefore, the perspective favoring the democratization of economy argues for communization instead of nationalization and thus, emphasizes the need for the development of common mechanisms of production, management and inspection.[20]

    Based on this argument, we may approach the second component of the politics of commons, which is the issue of self-government. The units of self-government, which are possibly the principal components for the democratization of economy, are also potentially the principal components of a social development project aimed at surpassing commodity relations. The concept of self-government is commonly used in relation to the political sphere. However, the institutions of self-government may also function as the fundamental mechanisms which could enable the workers to have the right to speak and participate in decision making processes both within a production process based on use-value and in the management process in general. These institutionalizations may be possible through cooperatives in agricultural sector, communized production units in industrial sector and common credit unions in finance sector.[21]

    Finally, the mechanism of democratic planning will be the complementary component of the politics of the commons by serving both the democratization of the economy and the coordination of units of self-government. As is known, the hegemonic theory and practice of development are not unrelated to the debates on planning. Despite having been discredited by the neoliberal development approach,[22]  development planning was a commonly used method, especially between the years 1945 and 1980. The new developmentalist approaches proposed as an alternative to the neoliberal development today bring the issue of development planning to the agenda. However, the fundamental problem with both the previous practices and the new proposals is that they argue for an economic planning by taking private property and the capitalist system for granted. In that case, various tools such as guaranteeing profit or tax reductions and subsidies were used to steer the investment of profit-driven private companies towards desired sites. However, in this structure, no sanction is applied to the capitalists if they do not act in line with the priorities of the plan. The plans prepared following these practices became shelved technocratic documents and since there was no sanction at stake, these documents were also used as a tool in canalizing social resources to the companies to support the accumulation of private capital.[23]

    The planning initiatives which take the capitalist system for granted constitute one of the fundamental contradictions of the theory and practice of development. However, the failure of the development plans does not mean that the mechanism of economic planning is to be abandoned. There is no proof to suggest that the free operation of the market system may have any positive results in the face of the ecological and economic crises which have become more frequent. In addition, economic planning has become all the more possible at the current level of technological development. Therefore, democratic planning is indispensable for the coordination and development of common initiatives feeding on the participatory mechanisms of self-government units and aiming at surpassing commodity relations.

     

    The Kernel of Post-Capitalist Social Relations: The Commons

    The experiences of development up to this date have led to the inclusion of the late capitalist countries in the capitalist system. The result of the grand capitalist development caused by these experiences has been the further aggravation of contradictions: unemployment and idle capacity, the homeless and residential oversupply, liquidity excess in financial markets and millions of people who are indebted more and more each day. Many needs that cannot be met and over-accumulation exist simultaneously and side by side. In this framework, to the extent that they were based on the capitalist development, the hegemonic theory and practices of development could not produce effective solutions either to “catch up with” the early capitalist countries or to reduce the existing social and economic inequalities. Therefore, it is time to move beyond the hegemonic development framework which is based on commodity relations and capitalist accumulation and to seriously think about the possible alternatives. Even though it needs to be developed further, the politics of the commons that I tried to outline above carries an important potential within this context.

    Finally, I would like to conclude this essay with a warning in relation to a crucial matter. With the market-centered neoliberal development model developed after the 1980s, public initiatives and social commons such as education, health, pension, access to water or social security were dissolved to a large extent. However, we need to underline the fact that integration with market relations does not have to result in the dissolution of the commons.[24]  In other words, the social commons which carry the potential kernels of post-capitalist social relations,[25]  the practices of commoning aiming at the realization of these potentials and commoning as a mode of organization need to be constantly constituted and re-constituted. Within this framework, the existence of the social commons may not produce a post-capitalist alternative on its own if they are not supported by the democratization of the economy, self-government and democratic planning.

     

    References

    [2] Akçay, Ü. (2007) Kapitalizmi Planlamak: Türkiye’de Planlama ve DPT’nin Dönüşümü, Istanbul: Sav Yayınları.

    [3] Türkay, M. (2009) Sermaye Birikimi, Kalkınma, Azgelişmişlik, Istanbul: Sav Yayınları.

    [4] Trak, A. (1984) “Gelişme İktisadının Gelişmesi: Kurucular”, Yapıt, 5: 50–61.

    [5] Antonio, J.R. (2013) “Plundering the Commons: the Growth Imperative in Neoliberal Times”, The Sociological Review, (61,2):18–42.

    [6] Fine, B. (2005) “Beyond the Developmental State: Towards a Political Economy of Development”, in Beyond Market-Driven Development, Editors: C. Lapavitsas and M Noguchi, London and New York: Routledge, 17-33.

    [7] Rodrik, D. (2006) “Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform.” Journal of Economic Literature, 44(4): 973-987.

    [8] Harvey, D. (2004) “The ‘New’ Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession”, Socialist Register 40: 63-87.

    [9] Akçay, Ü, Ergin, I. and Hassoy, H. (2011) “Kalkınma”nın Bilançosu: Eleştirel Bir Değerlendirme”, İktisat Dergisi, 519-520.

    [10] Akbulut, B., Madra, Y. M. and Adaman, F. (forthcoming, 2015) “The Decimation and Displacement of Development Economics,” Development and Change.

    [11] Karaçimen, E. (2015) Türkiye’de Finansallaşma: Borç Kıskacında Emek, Istanbul: Sav Yayınları.

    [12] Akçay, Ü. and Güngen, A.R. (2014) Finansallaşma, Borç Krizi ve Çöküş: Küresel Kapitalizmin Geleceği, Ankara: Notabene Yayınları.

    [13] Nixon, F. (2006) “Rethinking the Political Economy of Development: Back to Basics and Beyond”, Journal of International Development, 18: 967-981.

    [14] Grugel, J and Riggirozzi, P (2012) Post-neoliberalism in Latin America: Rebuilding and Reclaiming the State after Crisis”, Development and Change (43-1): 1–21.

    [15] Akçay, Ü, (2013) “Sermayenin Uluslararasılaşması ve Devletin Dönüşümü”, Praksis, 30-31: 11-39.

    [16] Escobar, A. (1992) “Imagining a Post-Development Era? Critical Thought, Development and Social Movements”, Social Text, 31: 20-56.

    [17] Hollender, R. (2015) “Post-Growth in the Global South: The Emergence of Alternatives to Development in Latin America”, Socialism and Democracy, (29-1): 73-101.

    [18] Fırat, B. Ö. and Genç, F (2014) “Strateji Tartışmasına Katkı: Müşterekler Politikasının Güncelliği”, Müşterekler, access: http://goo.gl/9hCl90.

    [19] Akçay, Ü (2014) “Ekonomik Demokrasi ama Nasıl? Özyönetim, Katılım ve Demokratik Planlamanın Güncelliği”, Demokratik Modernite, 11, access:https://goo.gl/yOma3F.

    [20] Akçay, Ü. and Azizoğlu, B. (2014) “Kamulaştırma mı? Kamusallaştırma mı?”, Başlangıç, Erişim: http://goo.gl/8WRe9I.

    [21] Akçay, Ü. and Azizoğlu, B. (2015) “Devletleştirme, Kamusallaştırma, Müşterekleştirme: Somut Ütopik Uğraklar Üzerine Düşünmek”, Başlangıç, 3; Güngen, A.R. (2014) “Kamusallaştırma ve Olanaklar”, Başlangıç, 21.12.2014, access: http://goo.gl/MLAz4s.

    [22] Öztürk, Ö. (2014) ”Piyasa Ekonomisinin Sonuna Doğru”, İktisat Dergisi, 539: 45-57.

    [23] Chibber, V. (2003) Locked in Place: State-Building and Late Industrialization in India, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    [24] Vaccaro, I; Zanotti, L.C. and Sepez, J (2009) “Commons and Markets: Opportunities for Development of Local Sustainability” Environmental Politics, 18(4): 522–538.

    [25] Caffentzis, G and Federici, S. (2014) “Commons Against and Beyond Capitalism”, Community Development Journal, 49(1): 92-105.

     


    This article previously appeared at Perspectives, Issue: 13, Link: http://tr.boell.org/de/node/2671

  • RIT @ Left Forum 2015

    RIT @ Left Forum 2015

    Research Institute on Turkey (RIT) is participating in the Left Forum 2015 with four panel discussions. In line with our areas of research, the main focus of these discussions is the concept of commonization. We aim to elaborate on the current state and extent of alternative commonization practices, which will be exemplified in maintaining a political opposition, establishing collective memory, production of knowledge in academia, and claiming public spaces. Our special guest is Sami Elvan, father of Berkin Elvan who was shot by a tear gas canister by the police during Gezi events. We dedicate this session to the memory of Berkin Elvan and Gezi Uprising in its second anniversary. All sessions will take place at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 524 W 59th St., New York, 10019.

    You are cordially invited!

    Panels:
    “Commons, Alternative Organizations and Turkey”
    Speakers: Özgür Narin, Ali Yalcin Göymen, Eylem Delikanli
    May 30th, 2015. 12 pm. Room L2.81.

    “Commonizing Academia for Open Knowledge”
    Speakers: Simten Cosar, Hakan Ergül, Emrah Göker, Caghan Kizil
    May 30th, 2015. 12 pm. Room 1.107.

    “Commonizing Collective Memory”
    Speakers: Sami Elvan, Ragip Zik, Eylem Delikanli
    May 30th, 2015. 3:15 pm. Room 1.107.

    “Commonizing Public Spaces Against Neoliberal Urbanization”
    Speakers: Esra Akcan, Mete Pamir, Emre Cetin Gürer
    May 31st, 2015. Room 1.103.

    For detailed information on speakers’ biographies and the meeting program please see Left Forum’s website: http://www.leftforum.org/ and the Facebook event page.

    ** Update: The video recordings of the panels can be found below.

  • DE-FIRE: Introducing the Debt and Financialization Research Network

    DE-FIRE: Introducing the Debt and Financialization Research Network

    * for Turkish click here / Türkçe duyuru için tıklayınız.

    Dear Friends!

    The Debt and Financialization Research Network (DE-FIRE), a project supported by the Research Institute on Turkey (RIT), has kicked off its activities in Spring 2015. In this note, we would like to share information about our inaugural events and upcoming activities.

    At a time when the repercussions of debt and financialization are becoming all the more visible, DE-FIRE has been initiated by Ümit Akçay, Bert Azizoğlu, Yetkin Borlu, Ali Rıza Güngen and Elif Karaçimen in April 2015 in order to bring together researchers focusing on these topics, develop cooperation opportunities and open up channels of mutual enhancement between researchers and the public.

    Members of DE-FIRE have recently published a series of op-ed articles in the Sunday Edition of the Turkish newspaper BirGun to initiate a more comprehensive debate on issue of debt and financialization. The first op-ed of this series is authored by Ümit Akçay and Bert Azizoğlu and outlines the historical evolution and contemporary repercussions of indebtedness and financialization. Ali Rıza Güngen’s essay concentrates on financial inclusion, which is one of the key component of financialization in public policy. In another essay, Yetkin Borlu discusses findings from his field research on the financialization in the agricultural sector of Turkey. Finally, Özlem Çelik and Elif Karaçimen explore the interdependencies between the finance and real estate sectors in Turkey and the role of construction sector in capital accumulation process of Turkey.

    On April 24-26, DE-FIRE held a panel discussion at the Historical Materialism Conference in New York to further contemplate on the issues initially addressed in the op-ed pieces published in BirGün. You can find the video recordings of the panel here. We would like to draw special attention to the discussion and Q&A section at the end of the panel.

    In the near future, we would like to bring together researchers who are interested in debt and financialization and enable a healthy exchange of information and ideas. We would like to commonize and further develop existing project ideas through this communication channel.

    You can find updates on DE-FIRE in Turkish here and in English here. You can contact us directly via defirenetwork@gmail.com or sign up for our newsletter.

    Sincerely,

    DE-FIRE Team

  • The Global Crisis in 2015 and the Turkish Economy – Ümit Akçay

    The Global Crisis in 2015 and the Turkish Economy – Ümit Akçay

    Approaches seeking the causes of the 2008 crisis in certain structural dynamics are mostly sought out within the scope of the Marxist tradition. Accordingly, the crisis resulting from the downward trend in profits by 1970s triggered significant amendments both in state-society relations and political economy paradigm. The political package that began to be called neoliberalism was designed to restore profitability of companies. The package basically aimed at undermining the economic, political and social power of the labor movement and trade unions. Flexibility and internationalization of the organization of production accompanied this program aspiring to weaken the labor movement and narrowing down its organizational capacities. The transformation of the state and the rise of a new right-wing politics marked the political direction of the era.

    During the implementation phase of the neoliberal package, two tendencies developed in central countries: financialization and deindustrialization. Financialization referred to rapid boom in profits of companies in the finance sector, first in the USA and then in other central countries when compared to companies in industry sector. In fact, it could be seen that such companies were present in both the finance and production sectors instead of tending to be in a single sector. Nevertheless, the share of finance in overall profit of companies active in both sectors gradually increased.2

    The second critical development was the intensification of competition among traditional production bases.3 Japanese and German companies aggressively entered sectors like automotive and electronics that had thus far been under unquestionable dominance of the USA. As a result of the increasing international competition, companies based in the USA started to shift their production to countries with cheap labor costs and strong infrastructure so as to reduce costs. Therefore, increasing competition and financialization, alongside with deindustrialization turned into an advancing dynamic for central countries.

    It is possible to see the effects of these changes at both in the structural and institutional level. The most significant development at the institutional level was the world-wide liberalization of capital movements and the gradual removal of existing financial regulations. This institutional transformation was buttressed by the belief that once intervention by external elements like trade unions and states ceased, the markets would automatically reach a balance and stabilize themselves within a steadily growing economy.4

    This belief In the fact that automatically operating markets would yield the best results for the entire society was strongest in the USA. The financial sector in the country, which was the strongest and the most powerful around the world, and the support towards consumption based on credit expansion (indebtedness) were also significant factors in the propagation of this belief. Credit expansion became a state policy because it not only triggered economic expansion but because it could also easily be converted into political support leading to the gradual removal of regulations limiting its expansion. Deregulation moves gradually implemented in the 1980s and 1990s were crowned with the removal of Glass-Steagall law in 1999.5 The New Financial Architecture (NFA) constituted by the end of 1990s was based on this.

    Essentially, NFA aimed at including the poor within the financial system.6 This financial incorporation was predominantly realized through the housing sector. Financial innovation and securitization mechanisms also had a significant role in the formation of the NFA. Debts with different terms and magnitudes were collected in a single pool and redistributed through these mechanisms, while corresponding new securities were launched. This process was accelerated through the establishment of a shadow banking system alongside the official banking system and functioning outside the regulations binding the first. One of the significant components of the NFA was credit evaluation institutions. What led asset-backed securities to be purchased by major actors, especially pension funds and institutional investors, was the assurance that they were to be trusted. The last column of the NFA was insurance companies. Insurance companies developed new derivative products to function as assurance in case assets evaluated by credit evaluation institutions went bankrupt. Thusly, a system developed in which it was practically believed that there was no risk of bankruptcy.

    The NFA was based on newly developed risk management techniques; alongside with financial innovation and securitization.7 Accordingly, fragmenting risks pertaining to a single financial institution so as to make each piece purchasable by other elements in the financial sector became an important application of new risk management technics. However, this was also the basis of the “systemic risk” laying the grounds for the demise of NFA itself.  Lastly, another feature making the establishment of the NFA possible was the interest rate that had been kept low in the 2000s until the eruption of the crisis. At the beginning of 2000s, when FED rapidly dropped the interest rates to overcome a recession and get over the economic tremor caused by September 11, the ground was laid for the NFA, which had been formed in the 1990s, to blossom.

    It did not take too long for the original US crisis to reach Europe, as the NFA had already gained international propagation in 1990s. However, with the increasing international financial integration, a problem occurring at one point in the system easily spread to other points. Firstly, European banks having invested in the USA and European companies directing institutional investments as pension funds were affected by the deflating financial system. Nevertheless, states intervened to prevent these companies trigger an overall deflation of the financial system and their debts were undertaken by the states as public debts. When the crisis reached Europe, its scale expanded and company bankruptcies started to give way to state bankruptcies. Iceland was first, but Greece was the one to take the lead in the European crisis.

     

    Intensification of the global crisis and the turning point in 2014

    By 2014, with the countries defined as “rising markets” having fallen into the grip of the crisis, the geographical expansion period of the crisis that had debuted in 2008 was finalized. 2014 was also the year when signals towards the intensification of the global crisis were also amplified. The most significant indicator of the intensification of the global crisis was the slowdown of the economic expansion trend in significant world-wide production bases. The economic growth of China that had continued since 2010 was slowing down and it was clear by 2014 that his slowdown would continue. Similarly, economic growth in Germany, another significant production base, has been continually decreasing since 2010.8 2014 saw economic growth in Europe and Japan almost reach the level of recession. In addition, the economic growth rate declined in developing countries. Apart from the decline in the growth rate, two more developments marked 2014. The first is the finalization of the quantitative expansion policy of FED going hand in hand with the moderate recovery in the USA, while the second is the acute drop in oil prices.

     

    FED decisions

    With the moderate recovery of the US economy and unemployment returning to pre-crisis rates, the FED took steps towards gradually finalizing the quantitative expansion programs during 2014. One of the main features of the recovery of the US markets was the further flexibilization of labor markets, which were already very flexible. Consequently, wealthy people benefited from the economic revitalization attained, while workers could not compensate for real salary losses. The decline of the unemployment rate was among the most important indicators of the growing economic activity. Nevertheless, this decline was accompanied by the drop of participation in the labor market.

    The most significant feature of the growth in the USA is the fact that it is based on an increase in credit. Similar to the beginning of the 2000s, low interest rates were warning signs for the NFA , which has become even stronger in overcoming the crisis; credit expansion, meaning increased indebtedness, became the main feature of the economic recovery in the USA. However, further flexibilization of labor markets or growth based on indebtedness does not mean anything for indicators such as the unemployment rate or economic growth calculating qualitative trends. Having operated according to such indicators, the FED gradually finalized its quantitative expansion program as of 2008 and announced that it could initiate an interest rate hike in 2015.

    Developments after the FED announcement in January 2014 can shed light on the second half of 2015, when the FED Is expected to implement an interest rate hike. The FED had announced that it would start declining its asset purchases realized within the scope of quantitative expansion strategy by 10 million dollars as of January 2014. As a result of this announcement, a significant amount of money flowed from countries like Turkey, Brazil, India and the Republic of South Africa and international funds entered US markets. Although this process played out differently in each country, the common trend was the simultaneous rise in inflation and interest rates, resulting in a major blow to economic growth.

     

    Oil prices

    The second important event that has marked the turn of the global crisis in 2014 is the abrupt fall in oil prices. Oil prices declined by around 50 percent from July to August 2014. The IMF announced that this decline in oil prices could contribute to global economic growth by 0.3 to 0.7 and claimed that it was “good news” that might accelerate the overall economic revitalization of world markets.9 However, this fall in oil prices, if it is an indicator of the deterioration of the global crisis, can only be read as “bad news,” contrary to what the IMF claims. Additionally, although the decline in oil prices is positive for countries importing oil, this might have other implications. For instance, as in the case of the USA, when the loss of energy companies become so great as to complicate the financial system, an unexpected panic could be set off. These signals have already started to be seen at the beginning of January 2015.10

    What is more intriguing about oil prices is that there is no decline in demand parallel to this decline in demand. To be more precise, we can see deepening global crisis refelected in the decreased demand for oil. OPEC countries were expected to reduce their oil production in response to shrinking demand. Nevertheless, contrary to expectations, no decision was taken in the meeting held last October regarding a possible reduction in oil supply. Oil production in Russia and Iraq even reached historical levels.11

    In line with the above data, we need to see the decline in oil prices as not merely an economic activity, but a result of different strategies adopted by various actors. When it comes to the strategies of the actors, the first thing that comes to mind and that which is mostly discussed is that the USA lowers oil prices as part of an initiative developed to penalize countries it sees as a threat.12 Although this approach seems to be appropriate when we consider its possible consequences, it is difficult to assume that the policies adopted by the USA alone would cause such a significant movement. The fact that Saudi Arabia, one of the significant actors of the process, is in a position to sustain its profits even with significantly lower prices shows that the decline in oil prices would not have the same impact for all oil producing countries.

     

    Local crises of 2014

    Lastly, it is noteworthy to indicate that economies in four countries had tremors with various dimensions in 2014. By the end of June 2014, panic erupted with the bankruptcy of the fourth biggest bank in the Bulgarian financial system, which could only be stopped by 2.3 billion Euros of support from the European Commission. Although the technocrats in Brussels claimed that the situation in Bulgaria was an “isolated” event, concerns about a possible crisis were raised due to the fundamental structure of the financial system.13 At a time when the tremor in Bulgaria was still reverberating, stock exchange operations of the biggest bank in Portugal were halted and the central bank was obliged to intervene. What is odd in this situation is that the banking system and the economy in general in Portugal have been de facto under the control of IMF programs since 2011. The crisis in Portugal clearly reveals the fact that austerity policies implemented around Europe had failed by 2014.14

    In August 2014, when the debt restructuring negotiations of the Argentinian government with hedge fund managers yielded no tangible results, the government declared that it could not pay a part of its debt.15 Lastly, capital movements resulting in a sharp drop in the value of the Russian ruble in December 2014 were signs that the Russian economy was in great distress. For a country covering half of its public expenditure and one-third of its exports through oil and gas sales, the biggest cause of the economic turmoil was undoubtedly the fall in oil prices. Investments on the side of the Western world due to the distress in Ukraine had already started to pressure Russia. However, in an atmosphere when the economic growth substantially slowed down, the decline in oil prices contributed to expectations towards a shrinking economy and capital outflows further deteriorated the situation.16

     

    Problems to be resolved in 2015

    Considering the estimates of international institutions regarding 2015, it can be foreseen that the main trends visible at the turn of 2014 will continue–meaning that the adverse impacts of the deepening global crisis will continue. Despite the statement of the Central Bank of the EU that all available means would be mobilized to resolve the crisis,17 2015 does not look very promising for European markets that are already at the edge of deflation and recession. Moreover, the victory of Syriza, the radical leftist party with anti-austerity policies, might cause a new rupture in the course of the crisis in Europe.18

    In addition to European markets being at the edge of economic recession due to austerity policies formulated by the ruling parties led by the German capital, news from China also reveal the fact that 2015 will not be that brilliant. China, whose steady growth came to a halt in 2007 and which entered a gradual decline in 2010, expects around 7 percent economic growth in 2015.19 Estimates regarding Japan are similar to those of Europe. Lastly, contrary to other geographies, the USA is expected to sustain its economic growth. However, this does not mean that adverse impacts of 2008 crisis have been completely resolved. As pointed above, the biggest risk for the US economy is whether the NFA operating through low interest rates would adapt to increasing interest rates.

    A gradual slowdown in the economic growth of countries has been obliged to increase interest rates following international outflow of funds marked in 2014. Hence, what has happened in January 2014 indicates what might be the results of a possible decision on the side of the FED to increase interest rates in 2015. The most significant impact is that funds seeking high income to increase their global value will start to return to the USA and the economic growth will thusly further decline in countries witnessing cash outflow. Consequently, events that have taken place in 2014 point towards areas that will be particularly affected by the crisis, especially towards the second half of 2015.

    It remains to be seen in 2015 whether China would consider repeating its recovery package offer to Russia to other countries as well.20 This offer was indeed not a simple foreign exchange swap; it was a move capable of substituting the functions of IMF, which is the ultimate lending authority in the world.21 China had a similar arrangement with countries like Argentina and Venezuela. In the case that Russia, a country rich in energy resources, overcomes its economic distress with the help of China, the share of world economy not governed by the dollar would expand, while at the same, the tokens of an alternative financial system to Bretton Woods established as of 1945 under the leadership of the USA would gain more ground.22 It is not realistic to anticipate that the US hegemony will recede in 2015, but signals from China show that the cracks in the US hegemony will be slightly enlarged.

     

    Turkish economy in 2015: AKP still fortunate!

    Following the record-breaking growth figures in the Turkish economy due to foreign capital flow in the aftermath of 2008 crisis, the growth trend started to stall as of 2012. The program adopted after the crisis was based on the construction and energy sectors aiming at making more expansive use of the opportunities of the inner market. The macro-economic framework making this program possible was based on cutting interest rates. Credit expansion achieved through declining interest rates was the motor of economic expansion after the crisis.

    Nevertheless, this policy was dogged by two problems. It was possible to reduce interest rates in times of abundant capital flow due to the expansion policy of the FED adopted to resolve the crisis, but the increasing credit expansion caused by low interest rates threatened the financial stability in return. Macro-prudential measures were implemented to overcome this risk, aspiring to take retarding measures in regard to cash flow so as to restrain the increasing current deficit and shrink credit expansion. However, the indirect result of macro-prudential measures was the slowdown of economic expansion.

    The second fundamental problem is that declining interest rates are substantially dependent on the fall of borrowing costs in the international finance system, i.e. FED’s quantitative expansion policy. Therefore, as of May 2013 witnessing a change in FED policy, it has become exceedingly difficult for the CBT to keep interests low. Indeed, the necessary intervention of the CBT in January 2014 showed that insisting on keeping the interest rates low in times of capital outflows would cause a rapid appreciation of foreign currency. By September 2014, the January decisions of the CBT regarding foreign exchange rate were underwhelmed, followed by a lower growth and higher unemployment rate.

    The main problem of economic administration in 2015 is that the borrowing cost in international markets will not be as cheap as in previous years. However, this problem is not unique to Turkey. The meaning of the FED’s crisis resolution strategy for countries like Turkey is, in the worst scenario, a transfer of the crisis to these countries and, in the best scenario, the onset of a low growth period. Circles close to the government are planning to balance this adverse pressure via the decline in oil prices and quantitative expansion announced by the European Central Bank.

    With respect to the general elections to be held in June 2015, it can be predicted that the economic administration is easing off until the elections due to various reasons. First, the closest OPEC meeting to resolve the excess supply obviously contributing to the fall in oil prices is in June 2015. Second, signals pointing to the face that the FED will not rush to increase interest rates are getting stronger. Contrary to the last meeting, it is expected in the June OPEC meeting that oil production will be reduced. If the estimates are well grounded, this might coincide with the FED decision to increase interest rates. In that case, it might be more difficult to sustain economic growth for oil importing countries like Brazil, Turkey or South African Republic. However, it is noteworthy to keep in mind that these two developments will occur in the second half 2015, after the general elections in June.

    Another advantage of the economy administration in terms of the general elections is the expectation of a possible fall in inflation in the first half of 2015 due to both oil prices and base effect. This might give the government a chance to reduce the interest rate before the elections. This will in return rapidly trigger credit expansion and the growth in the construction sector and prevent economy from becoming a problematic area for the government.

    Nevertheless, what is common to all these aforementioned factors that might ease the hand of the economy administration until the elections is that neither of them is under the control of the government. To be more precise, the fact that the economy seems to be manageable in the first six months is not the result of a successful economic policy. It is only made possible through external factors as oil prices, FED decisions, quantitative expansion in Europe and base effect. Hence, the government might be fortunate once more, at least in terms of economic administration, in the forthcoming elections. However, it would not be a surprise to see that the Turkish economy will once more be economically troubled as of the second half of 2015.

     

    References

    1. For the details of these three leveled analysis see: Ümit Akçay and Ali Rıza Güngen, Finansallaşma, Borç Krizi ve Çöküş: Küresel Kapitalizmin Geleceği, 2014, Ankara: Notabene Publishing House.

    1. Özgür Orhangazi, Financialization and the US Economy, 2008, Cheltenham, UK ve Northampton, US: Edward Elgar.
    2. Robert Brenner, Economics of Global Turbulence, 2006, London ve New York: Verso.
    3. Alan Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence, 2007, London ve New York: The Penguin Press.
    4. Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism, 2012, London and New York: Verso.
    5. Akçay and Güngen, Finansallaşma Borç Krizi ve Çöküş, s. 73.
    6. Dick Bryan and Michael Rafferty, Capitalism with Derivatives, 2006, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
    7. OECD, “OECD Composite Leading Indicators”, 8 October 2014, Paris. Accessed on: http://t.co/Qy8pYFizLt
    8. Rabah Azeki and Oliverclanchard, “Seven Questions about the Recent Oil Prce Slump”, IMF, 22 December 2014, Accessed on: http://goo.gl/CmNriz
    9. Michelle F. Davis and Callie Bost, “S&P 500 Heads Toward 4-Day Drop as Energy Shares Slump With Oil”, Bloomberg, 5 January 2015, Accessed on: http://goo.gl/0ipuAn
    10. Anna Andrianova and Grant Smith, “Russia and Iraq Supply Most Oil In Decades Amid 2015 Glut”, Bloomberg, 2 January 2015, Accessed on: http://goo.gl/shIUQe
    11. “Is the oil crash a secret US war on Russia?”, BBC News, 16 October 2014, http://goo.gl/CdPGXr
    12. Ümit Akçay, “Kriz Sürüyor, Bu Sefer Bulgaristan”, Kriz Notları, 1 July 2015,  Accessed on: http://goo.gl/cXszC5
    13. Ümit Akçay, “Sıradaki Kriz Gelsin: Bu sefer Portekiz”, Kriz Notları, 10 July 2015, Accessed on: http://goo.gl/XtMqrE
    14. Ümit Akçay, “Arjantin Akbabalara Karşı”, Kriz Notları, 2 August 2015, Accessed on: http://goo.gl/BN20f4
    15. Ümit Akçay, “Küresel Kriz ‘Derinleşirken’: Rusya Ekonomisi Çöktü!”, Kriz Notları, 17 December 2014, Accessed on: http://goo.gl/BXZPPZ
    16. ECB, “Speech by Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank”, Global Investment Conference, 26 July 2012, London, Accessed on: http://goo.gl/lSyggI
    17. Ali Rıza Güngen, “Syriza ve Muhtemel Borç Konferansı”, Kriz Notları, 30 December 2014, Accessed on: http://goo.gl/wzJlEF
    18. Sharon Chen, “Slow China Growth, Uneven Global Recovery Hampers Singapore’s Economy”, Bloomberg, 1 January, 2015, Accessed on: http://goo.gl/nu9A1j
    19. William Pesek, “China Steps In as World’s New Bank”, Bloomberg, 25 December 2014, Accessed on: http://goo.gl/ey3a0m
    20. Mark Adomanis, “The Ruble Crisis, Russia, And China”, Forbes, 23 December 2014, Accessed on: http://goo.gl/phe8J9
    21. Ye Xie, “Ruble Swap Shows China Challenging IMF as Emergency Lender”, Bloomberg, 22 December 2014, Accessed on: http://goo.gl/7MYzW7 

    This article previously appeared at Perspectives, Issue: 11, pp. 9-15, Link: http://tr.boell.org/de/node/2207

  • DE-FIRE: Panel on Financialization in Turkey at HMNY 2015

    DE-FIRE: Panel on Financialization in Turkey at HMNY 2015

    On April 25, 2015 the Debt & Financialization Research Network Turkey (DE-FIRE) has held a panel discussion at the Historical Materialism Conference 2015 in New York City. Below you can find the playlist including two of the three presentations and the Q&A session. More materials from these presentations will follow.

  • DE-FIRE: New Paper Published! “Interlinkages Between Credit, Debt and the Labour Market: Evidence from Turkey”

    DE-FIRE: New Paper Published! “Interlinkages Between Credit, Debt and the Labour Market: Evidence from Turkey”

    Elif Karacimen, member of the Debt and Financialization Research Network (DE-FIRE) Turkey has published her paper “Interlinkages between credit, debt and the labour market: evidence from Turkey” today in the Cambridge Journal of Economics. For details, please visit http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/content/39/3/751 Congratulations!